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Seeking Remedies for LGBTQ 
Children from Destructive Parental 




This Note explores the intersection of parents’ rights, 
religious rights, state’s rights, and children’s rights. This Note 
analyzes the development of children’s rights and how those 
rights may be applied to current state religious exemption 
policies that affect the health of LGBTQ children. This Note will 
argue that in the absence of direct federal legislation to stop the 
harm of LGBTQ children, four possible remedies may exist to 
protect LGBTQ children. These remedies include states 
asserting parens patriae authority, children asserting 
substantive due process claims, children utilizing partial 
emancipation statutes, or children utilizing mature minor 
exemptions, which provide a judicial bypass procedure. This 
Note posits that these remedies should be guaranteed for LGBTQ 
minors when life-altering or life-endangering choices are made 
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I. Introduction 
In October 2018, the New York Times published an article 
titled, “‘Transgender’ Could Be Defined Out of Existence Under 
Trump Administration.”1 That headline encapsulates one of the 
latest political attacks on the LGBTQ community. When the 
Supreme Court recognized same-sex marriage in Obergefell v. 
 
 1. See Erica L. Green et al., ‘Transgender’ Could Be Defined Out of 
Existence Under Trump Administration, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/10/21/us/politics/transgender-trump-administration-
sex-definition.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2020) (discussing the Trump 
administration’s choice to define gender narrowly for application within 
federal programs under Title IX) [https://perma.cc/UD8K-UHH3]. 
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Hodges,2 the LGBTQ community rejoiced in victory.3 However, 
that valuable progress toward LGBTQ equality carries with it 
the risk of victory blindness.4 Since Obergefell, many states have 
enacted various pieces of legislation to curtail the rights of the 
LGBTQ community.5 This Note specifically considers legislative 
action that harms LGBTQ children.  
Religious Freedom Restoration Act bills allow 
discrimination against LGBTQ children in the name of religious 
freedom.6 State bills have manifested in different ways to 
specifically affect LGBTQ youth, such as anti-all-comers policies 
in response to Christian Legal Society v. Martinez,7 limited 
 
 2. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (“These 
considerations lead to the conclusion that the right to marry is a fundamental 
right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the 
same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty.”). 
 3. See MICHELANGELO SIGNORILE, IT’S NOT OVER:  GETTING BEYOND 
TOLERANCE, DEFEATING HOMOPHOBIA, AND WINNING TRUE EQUALITY 180 (2016) 
(“It was a profound and celebratory moment, and at Pride Month parades 
across the country, many of us literally danced in the streets.”). 
 4. See id. at 3 (describing victory blindness as a phenomenon which 
occurs after a social group gains important strides toward success and turns a 
blind eye to the continued discrimination occurring, illustrated by 
anti-LGBTQ movements post-Obergefell when LGBTQ individuals were 
paying less attention). 
 5. See Michael Gordon et al., Understanding HB2:  North Carolina’s 
newest law solidifies state’s role in defining discrimination, THE CHARLOTTE 
OBSERVER (Mar. 26, 2016, 11:00 AM), https://www.charlotteobserver.com
/news/politics-government/article68401147.html (updated Sept. 14, 2016) (last 
visited Mar. 16, 2020) (discussing North Carolina’s bill reversing a Charlotte 
ordinance that protected various rights of LGBTQ individuals, including 
bathroom protections) [https://perma.cc/S2LV-KMMU]. 
 6. See CATHRYN OAKLEY, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUND., 
DISREGARDING THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD:  LICENSES TO DISCRIMINATE IN 
CHILD WELFARE SERVICES 5–8 (2017) (discussing various state Religious 
Freedom Restoration Acts providing opportunities for child welfare service 
providers to discriminate against LGBTQ children). 
 7. See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. 
of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 696 (2010) (affirming the 
constitutionality of all-comers policies that require student organizations that 
receive financial support to not discriminate against new members); see also 
Kery Murakami, Tying Grant Eligibility to Religious Freedom, INSIDE HIGHER 
ED (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/02/07/colleges-
worry-about-implications-religious-freedom-rule (last visited Mar. 6, 2020) 
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public forum bills,8 and religious exemptions for child welfare 
service providers.9  
Religious exemptions for child welfare service providers 
create an unfortunate opportunity for child welfare agencies to 
discriminate under the guise of religion.10 Various states have 
privatized child welfare systems and private systems allow 
providers to create their own set of principles to govern their 
facilities.11 During the latter half of the twentieth century, 
states have trended toward privatized child welfare.12 
Provider-created governing principles may include 
discriminatory policies allowed by religious exemptions, such as 
a prohibition on same-sex couples adopting children or forced 
conversion therapy and prohibition of hormone therapy for 
foster children.13  
 
(discussing the current legal landscape for all-comers policies) [https://
perma.cc/98Z4-NAUU]. 
 8. See Ryan Wilson, HRC & Equality FL Express Concern for Overly 
Broad Religious Expression Legislation in Florida, HUMAN RTS. CAMPAIGN 
FOUND. (May 9, 2017), https://www.hrc.org/blog/hrc-equality-fl-express-
concern-for-overly-broad-religious-expression-legis (last visited Mar. 16, 2020) 
(discussing broad state religious expression legislation that allows student 
speakers to make anti-LGBTQ statements at school events pursuant to 
personal religious beliefs) [https://perma.cc/SZ6M-LX96]. 
 9. See OAKLEY, supra note 6, at 3 (“At the close of 2017, seven states 
have versions of license to discriminate in child welfare laws on the books—
three of which were passed in 2017 and five of which were passed in the last 
three years.”). 
 10. See id. (“Some providers of child welfare services, citing religious 
objections, have threatened to cease providing state-funded services if they are 
forced to serve same-sex couples or other potential parents seeking to adopt a 
child . . . .”). 
 11. See PLANNING AND LEARNING TECH., INC. & THE UNIV. OF KY., 
LITERATURE REVIEW ON THE PRIVATIZATION OF CHILD WELFARE SERVICES 1 
(2006) (“Privatization is a process where functions and responsibilities in 
whole or in part are shifted from government to the private sector. 
Privatization can take various forms including vouchers and public-private 
partnerships.”). 
 12. See id. at 2 (“National surveys found that during the 1990s, between 
50 percent to 80 percent of states had increased their reliance on contracted 
social services to cope with new constraints on public resources.”). 
 13. See OAKLEY, supra note 6, at 3 (“[T]heir purpose is to enshrine 
discrimination into law by granting state contractors and grantees who 
provide taxpayer-funded child welfare services the ability to discriminate with 
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Religious exemptions for child welfare service providers 
cast a larger spotlight on general parental authority, which may 
be harmful to LGBTQ youth. LGBTQ children have, 
unfortunately, found themselves in the crosshairs of the battle 
over LGBTQ rights.14 The safety of all LGBTQ children is 
threatened by religious exemptions, and the fight against 
religious exemptions has resulted in few successes.15 The 
development of children’s rights through direct legislation, 
substantive due process claims, partial emancipation, or mature 
minor exemptions will provide needed protection to LGBTQ 
children, to keep them from unnecessary harm.  
This Note will consider how parental authority can be 
harmful for LGBTQ children within the child welfare system 
and more broadly. In general, parents have the right to make 
medical decisions on behalf of their children.16 However, this 
right is limited if the decision is harmful.17 Legal challenges 
may be necessary to remove discriminatory child welfare 
policies; this Note focuses on remedies for the LGBTQ children 
caught up in the child welfare system. Although the Note 
focuses on LGBTQ children in the child welfare system, the 
remedies discussed should translate to any LGBTQ children, 
even those facing harmful parental authority outside of the 
child welfare services context.  
This Note will examine the development of children’s rights 
and how those rights may be used to combat current religious 
 
impunity in the provision of those services against qualified same-sex couples 
or LGBTQ individuals who want to adopt.”). 
 14. See id. at 5 (describing various state laws that allow child welfare 
providers to discriminate in ways directly affecting LGBTQ children, including 
one allowing the providers to “refus[e] to accept a referral for placement 
services if the agency objects to the child or the likely placement of the child”).   
 15. See id. at 8 (discussing the failure of discrimination-based challenges 
to the growth of religious freedom protection statutes). 
 16. See Douglas S. Diekema, Parental Decision Making, U. WASH., https://
depts.washington.edu/bhdept/ethics-medicine/bioethics-topics/detail/72 (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2020) (describing the general freedom parents have to make 
medical decisions for their children) [https://perma.cc/7YKB-XU7J].  
 17. See id. (“Medical caretakers have an ethical and legal duty to 
advocate for the best interests of the child when parental decisions are 
potentially dangerous to the child’s health, imprudent, neglectful, or 
abusive.”).   
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exemption policies that target the health of LGBTQ children. 
The Note will argue that, in the absence of direct legislation, 
substantive due process claims, partial emancipation statutes, 
or mature minor exemptions that provide a judicial bypass 
procedure should be guaranteed for LGBTQ minors when life-
altering or life-endangering choices are made by any parental 
figure or guardian. Part II begins with the historical background 
of children’s rights and an overview of the constitutional 
development of parental rights in the United States. Part II 
considers parens patriae and the authority of the state, and 
provides examples of state revocation of parental rights. Part II 
concludes by discussing the independent rights of children and 
the elimination of the parent–state dichotomy of control over 
children. Part III analyzes risks and harms LGBTQ children 
experience. Part III then discusses current child welfare service 
laws that allow providers to discriminate against children on 
the basis of religious and moral objections. Finally, Part IV 
concludes by proposing four remedies to enhance children’s 
rights for LGBTQ youth. These proposed remedies include state 
intervention under parens patriae, substantive due process 
claims, partial emancipation, and mature minor exemptions. 
II. Historical Overview of the Contours of Children’s Rights 
A. Parental Rights over Children Throughout United States 
History 
Children were considered the property of their parents or 
the state—common law chattel—throughout much of the United 
States’ history.18 Parents exercised control over their children, 
their commodity.19 Historically, children had no rights at all.20 
At best, any rights afforded to children were secondary to 
 
 18. See Kevin Noble Maillard, Rethinking Children As Property:  The 
Transitive Family, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 225, 237 (2010) (discussing the historic 
view of children as parental property). 
 19. See id. (stating children were viewed as a commodity where 
ownership and dominion would be presumed). 
 20. See id. (“At common law, children were treated as chattel.”). 
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parental authority and state control.21 Debates about children’s 
rights traditionally focused on parents as the property owner, 
and the state as the property giver.22  
Children were viewed as an economic asset of their parents 
until the late eighteenth century.23 Children worked for the 
economic well-being of their families, whether on a farm or a 
trade apprenticeship in the community.24 Children’s work was 
to financially benefit their parents, generally through the age of 
twenty-one.25 The level of control exerted over children was 
reinforced by community and religious values, ensuring 
children were both maintained and controlled. 26 
In the early nineteenth century, the status of child labor 
began to change due to overall economic growth in society.27 
Children left home to work in factories at young ages.28 Thus 
emerged the doctrine of emancipation:  releasing a child from 
economic servitude to the family and releasing the parent from 
the responsibility of supporting the child.29 Respublica v. 
 
 21. See id. (recognizing that throughout the United States’ history 
children had very few rights and those that were recognized would be 
considered less controlling than a parental property right). 
 22. See id. at 227 (discussing the child as owned by the parent or state 
when determining property claims). 
 23. See F. Raymond Marks, Detours on the Road to Maturity:  A View of 
the Legal Conception of Growing Up and Letting Go, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Summer, 1975, at 80 (discussing historical assumptions that adult economic 
roles applied equally to children). 
 24. See id. (stating no matter the field of work a child may be engaged 
with, either directly for a parent or for another master, the pay was provided 
to a parent or guardian). 
 25. See id. (discussing the economic control of children extended until the 
age of twenty-one). 
 26. See id. (highlighting community goals to keep children from becoming 
a public charge or a public nuisance which was the subject of “stubborn 
children” laws, the antecedent to minors in need of supervision jurisdiction). 
 27. See id. at 81 (recognizing the effect technological growth during the 
industrial era had on children utilized in the labor market). 
 28. See id. (discussing the young ages at which children would leave home 
to work in the factory setting). 
 29. See id. at 82 (highlighting the emergence of emancipation of children 
as a byproduct of children leaving home to work in factories). 
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Keppele30 is an early example of courts considering limitations 
on parental rights to bind the child to work.31 During this time, 
the age of maturity became flexible and child runaway laws 
were no longer enforced.32 Although the colonial period 
recognized strict parental control, the early nineteenth century 
provided for early maturation of children and a rise in 
recognition of a child’s right to seek emancipation.33 
The close of the nineteenth century brought 
industrialization and the rise of the nuclear family.34 The 
nuclear family emphasized a prolonged role for parents in the 
preparation of children.35 Three major legal and political 
moves—the creation of the juvenile court system, enactment of 
child labor laws, and the development of compulsory 
education—expanded the realm of parental control and delayed 
economic roles for children.36 Although these new institutions 
were generally motivated by economic interests, their 
development provided many initial protections and guarantees 
for children.37  
 
 30. See Respublica v. Keppele, 2 U.S. 197, 199 (Pa. 1793) (concluding that 
overseers of minors do not have authority to bind minors to indentured 
servanthood). 
 31. See id. at 198 (providing that parental authority was limited by social 
customs, specifically applied as a limitation for parents to bind their children 
as a servant). 
 32. See Marks, supra note 23, at 83 (considering the young age many 
children were leaving home to seek work, a minor’s right to depart from his 
parent’s home was recognized and child neglect laws were not applied in these 
situations). 
 33. See id. at 85 (contrasting the differences in colonial era and 
mid-eighteenth century parental authority). 
 34. See id. at 86 (discussing the period of 1870–1920 as the industrial era 
when the nuclear family concept began to develop). 
 35. See id. (discussing value in parental identity shifting to parental 
ability to prepare children for success). 
 36. See id. at 86–88 (acknowledging the legislative development of the 
juvenile court system, child labor laws, and compulsory education provided 
greater parental authority over children even as the children grew older). 
 37. See id. at 87–88 (analyzing the economic motivations behind the 
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By the early twentieth century, the trend toward children 
having an independent status slowed.38 Compulsory education 
laws turned schools into social institutions that would prepare 
children for their adult lives.39 The time frame for adult 
preparation expanded, a phenomenon unique to the modern 
era.40 
B. Constitutional Foundations for the Fundamental Right of 
Parents to Control the Upbringing of Their Children 
1. The Origin of Constitutional Parental Rights and Seminal 
Cases Relating to Such Rights 
Throughout the early twentieth century, the effects of 
industrialization and the nuclear family led to powerful 
parental authority.41 The Supreme Court responded by 
guaranteeing a constitutional right for parents to raise their 
children free from government intervention in Meyer v. 
Nebraska42 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters43 in the 1920s.44 
 
 38. See id. at 88 (concluding that the shift away from economic roles for 
adolescents eroded the right to emancipation that had developed in the 
eighteenth century for adolescents). 
 39. See id. (“[T]hey sought to designate the school as the social institution 
other than the family that would formally prepare him for life.”). 
 40. See id. (“With the passage of child labor legislation, the prolongation 
of childhood was facilitated. Henceforward, adult economic roles would be out 
of reach of adolescents, and adolescence would be more clearly defined as a 
formal and dependent period of life.”). 
 41. See id. at 86 (analyzing how the limitations due to child labor laws 
and compulsory school attendance force youth to obey parents with no 
practical alternative). 
 42. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (concluding 
Nebraska law restricting foreign language classes violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 43. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (concluding 
that Oregon’s Compulsory Education Act unreasonably interferes with 
parental rights).  
 44. See id. at 535 (“The child is not the mere creature of the state; those 
who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high 
duty, to prepare him for additional obligations.”); see also Meyer, 262 U.S. at 
403 (“We are constrained to conclude that the statute as applied is arbitrary 
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These cases struck down compulsory education laws, which had 
become universal in the United States.45 The fundamental 
rights of parents in U.S. law, specifically parental discretion in 
child rearing, were established in the context of ensuring 
adequate education.46 “The Child is not the mere creature of the 
state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the 
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him 
for additional obligations.”47 Pierce discusses the state’s 
relinquishment of total rights over children and the state’s 
grant of those rights to the parent.48 This transferal of rights 
provides parents the liberty to act on behalf of their children and 
have no fear of legislative interference with their parental rights 
without a competent state purpose.49 
The Supreme Court advanced the concept of fundamental 
parental rights through a substantive due process analysis 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.50 The fundamental parental 
rights established in Meyer and Pierce have been upheld 
throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.51 The 
Court has repeatedly acknowledged the primacy of the role of 
 
and without reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the 
State.”). 
 45. See Marks, supra note 23, at 88 (stating in 1890 twenty-nine states 
had adopted compulsory education laws, extending to every state by 1918). 
 46. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 531–33 (challenging the Oregon Compulsory 
Education Act requiring public education for children age eight to sixteen if 
adequate alternatives are available). 
 47. Id. at 535. 
 48. See id. at 534–35 (discussing the right of States to provide public 
education and the distinct right of parents to direct the child’s education). 
 49. See id. at 535 (“[R]ights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be 
abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to some purpose 
within the competency of the state.”). 
 50. See C.P. Dominic Ayotte, Troxel v. Granville:  Parental Power to 
Determine Associational Interests of Children, 52 BAYLOR L. REV. 997, 1003 
(2000) (recognizing a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment granted through various Supreme Court holdings). 
 51. Cf. id. (discussing the seminal cases Meyer and Pierce, as well as 
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parents in the upbringing of their children.52 “We have 
recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between 
parent and child is constitutionally protected.”53 
Government authorities may not break up families without 
a showing of parental unfitness and consideration of the best 
interest of the child.54 Parents may decide on a course of action 
that is not agreeable to their children or has inherent risk.55 
Children and parents maintain an interest in continuing their 
natural relationship.56 The best interest of the child standard 
does not always govern parents’ custody because as long as 
minimal requirements of child care are met, the interest of the 
child may be subordinated to other interests.57 Notably, Troxel 
 
 52. See Ayotte, supra note 50, at 1003 (“The primacy of the individual—
that is, a parent or parents—in all matters of childrearing has been alluded to 
repeatedly.”). 
 53. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (citing Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 US. 205, 231–33 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651–52 
(1972); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–401 (1923)). 
 54. See id. (describing the importance of the family unit and the child’s 
best interest test). The Court stated: 
We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended 
if a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, 
over the objections of the parents and their children, without some 
showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to do so was 
thought to be in the children’s best interest. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 55. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) (“Simply because the 
decision of a parent is not agreeable to a child or because it involves risks does 
not automatically transfer the power to make that decision from the parents 
to some agency or officer of the state.”). 
 56. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982) (“[U]ntil the State 
proves parental unfitness, the child and his parents share a vital interest in 
preventing erroneous termination of their natural relationship.”). 
 57. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 304 (1993) (noting the best interest 
of the child test is not always the legal standard). The court stated: 
“[T]he best interests of the child” is not the legal standard that 
governs parents’ or guardians’ exercise of their custody:  so long as 
certain minimum requirements of child care are met, the interests 
of the child may be subordinated to the interests of other children, 
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v. Granville58 found that a parent’s choice to limit third-party 
visitation was a valid exercise of parental authority.59 Troxel 
explicitly recognized a fundamental parental right based on the 
history of parental interest in raising children within the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.60 The parental 
authority to make decisions regarding care, custody, and control 
of children is thoroughly rooted in constitutional 
jurisprudence.61 
2. The Coupling of the Right to Parent and the Right to Freely 
Exercise Religion 
Claims for parental rights often coincide with religious 
freedom. The First Amendment establishes the right to the free 
exercise of religion.62 In Reynolds v. United States,63 the Court 
ruled that the Free Exercise Clause protects religious beliefs 
against regulation.64 However, the Free Exercise Clause does 
not protect actions based on religious beliefs from regulation, if 
the regulation is neutral on its face.65 The Court in Reynolds 
 
 58. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 75 (2000) (concluding that a 
Washington state law allowing third parties to petition for visitation over 
parental objections was an unconstitutional infringement on parental rights). 
 59. See id. at 67–69 (disagreeing with a Washington state statute 
allowing a judge to give no deference to a parent’s estimation of her child’s best 
interest). 
 60. See id. at 65 (“The liberty interest at issue in this case—the interest 
of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the 
oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”). 
 61. See id. (discussing the fundamental nature and jurisprudential 
history of the right to control the upbringing of one’s child).  
 62. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”). 
 63. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (concluding 
that a law banning polygamy did not infringe upon the Free Exercise Clause 
of the First Amendment). 
 64. See id. at 165–66 (describing polygamy as an unconstitutional 
unprotected religious action rather than a constitutionally protected religious 
belief). 
 65. See id. at 166 (arguing polygamy had always been “an offense against 
society” and therefore not an action protected under the First Amendment and 
punishable by statute if it is broadly applied). 
 
  
638 26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 625 (2020) 
 
ensured that religious beliefs could not become superior to the 
law of the land.66 
In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources 
of Oregon v. Smith,67 the Court returned to and relied upon the 
Reynolds standard.68 Before that decision, Supreme Court 
jurisprudence had begun to suggest that a plaintiff’s case 
regarding religious actions may be successful under a Free 
Exercise Clause exemption.69 In Employment Division, the 
Court restored the distinction between religious belief and 
religious action, finding religious-based actions are not 
protected under a generally neutral law.70 Under Employment 
 
 66. See id. at 167 (“To permit this would be to make the professed 
doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to 
permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”). 
 67. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 
882 (1990) (holding the Reynolds standard was appropriate, thus Oregon is 
not prohibited under the Free Exercise Clause from maintaining facially 
neutral laws regulating actions), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, as recognized in 
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 714–15 (2005). 
 68. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882 (finding the Reynolds standard to provide 
the appropriate distinction between protecting religious belief and religiously 
motivated action). 
 69. See Walz v. Tax Comm’n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 716 (1970) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (suggesting that a regulation neutral on its face will 
still run afoul of the Establishment Clause if it unduly burdens the free 
exercise of religion); see also Steven H. Aden & Lee J. Strang, When A “Rule” 
Doesn’t Rule:  The Failure of the Oregon Employment Division v. Smith 
“Hybrid Rights Exception,” 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 573, 579 (2003) (“On Oregon’s 
appeal, the claimants likely felt confident that the Court’s prior free exercise 
jurisprudence in the area of unemployment compensation would lead to 
affirmance.”). 
 70. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882 (addressing that religious based actions 
may be regulated by the government if the regulation is neutral). The Court 
stated: 
Respondents urge us to hold, quite simply, that when otherwise 
prohibitable conduct is accompanied by religious conviction, not 
only the convictions but the conduct itself must be free from 
governmental regulation. We have never held that, and decline to 
do so now. There being no contention that Oregon’s drug law 
represents an attempt to regulate religious beliefs, the 
communication of religious beliefs, or the raising of one’s children 
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Division, religious-based actions are only protected if the hybrid 
rights exception is applicable.71 The hybrid rights exception 
requires that a free exercise claim be coupled with another 
constitutional protection, such as parental rights, before the 
court strikes down a neutral and generally applicable law.72 
The hybrid rights exception was short-lived. It was 
preempted three years later by the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (hereinafter “RFRA”).73 The Court’s 
abandonment of the compelling state interest test in favor of a 
rule allowing restrictions as long as the restrictions were not 
targeted at a specific religious group was unpopular.74 An 
unexpected bipartisan alliance, which included both prominent 
Christian religious organizations and the American Civil 
Liberties Union, developed to implement RFRA, which passed 
with a vote of ninety-seven to three in the Senate.75 
 
in those beliefs, the rule to which we have adhered ever since 
Reynolds plainly controls. 
Id. 
 71. See Aden & Strang, supra note 69, at 580 (stating the Free Exercise 
Clause absolutely protects religious beliefs and actions prohibited solely 
because of religious motivation, but only protects against generally applicable 
laws if another constitutional protection was involved). 
 72. See id. (“The Court synthesized its prior free exercise jurisprudence, 
stating that past cases that had required exemptions from neutral, generally 
applicable laws presented ‘hybrid situation[s]’ where there was a free exercise 
claim connected with a ‘communicative activity or parental right.’”) (citations 
omitted). 
 73. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 714–15 (2005) (stating that the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act was implemented in response to the Dep’t 
of Human Res. of Oregon decision); see also Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–2000bb-4 (1993) (stating the exact requirements by 
which the “Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of 
religion”). 
 74. See Peter Steinfels, Clinton Signs Law Protecting Religious Practices, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 1993), https://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/17/us/clinton-
signs-law-protecting-religious-practices.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2020) 
(discussing the immediate actions of “an unusual coalition of liberal, 
conservative and religious groups that had pressed for the new law” which was 
viewed as “the most significant piece of legislation dealing with our religious 
liberty in a generation”) [https://perma.cc/83ZJ-Y53D]. 
 75. See id. (expressing the almost unanimous support as the House 
passed the Act by a voice vote with no objections). 
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Even though the original RFRA was a bipartisan effort with 
good intentions,76 after it was passed, the Free Exercise Clause 
began to be weaponized.77 Statutorily protected religious 
freedom exemptions allowing discrimination against LGBTQ 
children have resulted.78 RFRA created the opportunity for 
broad religious freedom exemption laws that discriminate 
against LGBTQ individuals, without the hybrid rights 
framework and Reynolds standard.79 
Even before RFRA, the Supreme Court had affirmed 
parental rights in the context of religious claims in Wisconsin v. 
 
 76. See id. (describing the support that the RFRA’s enactment enjoyed 
across the political spectrum). 
 77. See Adam Sonfield, In Bad Faith:  How Conservatives Are 
Weaponizing “Religious Liberty” to Allow Institutions to Discriminate, 21 
GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 23, 23 (2018) (“Social conservatives have fought for 
extensive religious and moral exemptions for health care, educational, social 
service and other institutions.”); see also Who is Weaponizing Religious 
Liberty?, PEOPLE FOR THE AM. WAY, http://www.pfaw.org/report/who-is-
weaponizing-religious-liberty/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2020) (discussing the over 
one-hundred anti-equality bills targeting LGBTQ people in various state 
legislatures, described as protecting religious freedom) [https://perma.cc
/J89W-EWZB]. 
 78. Compare Sonfield, supra note 77 (providing various reasons for the 
original bill such as protecting minority religious groups from government 
interests such as mandatory autopsies or zoning laws affecting places of 
worship), with Oakley, supra note 6, at 3 (discussing the broad expansion of 
religious freedom exemptions tailored specifically against the interests of 
LGBTQ individuals). 
 79. See, e.g., Brian Miller, The Age of RFRA, FORBES (Nov. 16, 2018, 3:46 
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/briankmiller/2018/11/16/the-age-of-rfra
/#7f3e7da877ba (last visited Mar. 8, 2020) (discussing the use of the RFRA to 
apply state laws that discriminate against LGBTQ individuals) [https://
perma.cc/RB26-VJJV]; TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.005(a) (West 2018) (“A 
child welfare services provider may not be required to provide any service that 
conflicts with the provider’s sincerely held religious beliefs.”); Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727–28 
(2018) (analyzing whether store owners may refuse service to LGBTQ 
individuals when claiming religious freedom exemptions and violations of 
First Amendment protections); Wilson, supra note 8 (discussing a  broad state 
religious expression law allowing student speakers to make anti-LGBTQ 
statements at school events pursuant to personal religious beliefs). 
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Yoder.80 Yoder considered the nexus of a religious exemption 
under the Free Exercise Clause and the parental right to 
determine a child’s upbringing.81 Wisconsin’s compulsory school 
attendance policy required children to attend public or private 
school until the age of sixteen.82 Members of the Old Order 
Amish religion declined to send their children to school after the 
eighth grade.83 The parents objected to formal education after 
eighth grade based on their sincerely held religious beliefs.84  
Yoder, consistent with Pierce, recognized the interest of a 
state to provide universal education.85 However, when a statute 
impinges on fundamental rights such as religious freedom and 
parental rights, the state must show an interest “of sufficient 
magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under 
the free exercise clause.”86 The Court concluded that “however 
strong the State’s interest in universal compulsory education, it 
is by no means absolute to the exclusion or subordination of all 
other interests.”87 Therefore, interests with significant 
 
 80. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235–36 (1972) (concluding 
Wisconsin’s compulsory education law violated the First Amendment rights of 
the Amish). 
 81. See id. at 233–34 (“[T]he power of the parent, even when linked to a 
free exercise claim, may be subject to limitation under Prince if it appears that 
parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a 
potential for significant social burdens.”). 
 82. See id. at 207 n.2 (citing Wisconsin’s compulsory school attendance 
law, Wis. Stat. § 118.15, which required parents to send children between the 
age of seven and sixteen to attend school regularly unless the child had legal 
excuse or had graduated). 
 83. Id. at 207. 
 84. See id. at 210 (stating the Old Order Amish communities believe in a 
fundamental salvation that requires community separate from worldly 
influence and values). 
 85. See id. at 213 (“There is no doubt as to the power of a State, having a 
high responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose reasonable 
regulations for the control and duration of basic education.”) (citations 
omitted). 
 86. See id. at 214 (discussing Pierce as an example where if parents are 
meeting the obligations of education the right to direct the educational 
upbringing of children will be left in the hands of the parents). 
 87. See id. at 215 (arguing only interests of the most importance can 
overcome claims to the free exercise of religion, which a state’s interest in 
education will not always overcome). 
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magnitude, such as the rights of parents alongside religious 
rights, may outweigh the interests of the state.88 Parental rights 
coupled with claims of religious freedom provide a more 
compelling argument against state regulation of children. 
3. Yoder and the Implied Limits on Parental Rights 
Even as the conception of children as property gave way to 
more specific parental rights that would be constitutionally 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, these parental rights 
had limitations. Yoder states that the rights of parents will not 
be absolute, and may give way to concerns over the health and 
safety of the child.89 Additionally, parental rights will be 
overcome by significant social burdens, such as the state’s 
burden to educate future generations to become productive 
members of society.90 Both the concurring and dissenting 
opinions in Yoder provide insight about concerns that amount 
to significant social burdens. 
Justice White’s concurrence analyzed the state interest in 
providing education and concluded that education is the most 
important function of the state.91 The state’s interest is to 
nurture and develop potential within children to prepare them 
for a productive life.92 It is possible that many Amish children 
wish to continue living a simple rural life; however, some 
 
 88. See id. (analyzing the Old Order Amish claims to the free exercise of 
religion as an interest supreme to state regulated education). 
 89. See id. at 233–34 (providing a two-part evaluation where parental 
rights may be limited; first, if parental decisions jeopardize the health and 
safety of the child, and second, if potentially significant social burdens exist). 
 90. See id. (suggesting adequate education for children to become 
self-supporting responsible citizens is a significant social burden, but the 
Amish had not jeopardized this burden). 
 91. See id. at 239 (White, J., concurring) (“Today, education is perhaps 
the most important function of state and local governments.” (quoting Brown 
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954))). 
 92. See id. at 240 (discussing the varied state interests that are met 
through compulsory education such as increasing tolerance, strengthening 
sensibility, and developing strengths in creativity and problem-solving). 
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children abandon the Amish faith.93 These children may wish to 
eventually hold various other occupations and need to be 
adequately prepared, instead of limited, by their parents’ 
choices.94 Justice White considered the case close, but concluded 
Wisconsin did not meet the burden to show forgoing one or two 
additional years of school would be intellectually limiting for 
children and thus did not hinder the legitimate state interest in 
preparing children for future vocations.95 
Justice Douglas dissented in the Yoder decision, writing 
that the decision to remove the child from school should not be 
the parent’s choice alone.96 Justice Douglas critiqued the 
majority for assuming that the only two interests at stake were 
those of the parents and those of the state.97 Justice Douglas 
stated “the parents [were] seeking to vindicate not only their 
own free exercise claims, but also those of their high-school-age 
children.”98 When a child is mature enough to have potentially 
conflicting religious beliefs, not considering those beliefs would 
be an invasion of the child’s rights.99 Justice Douglas suggested 
that litigation may often be the best method for a child to 
express conflicting desires with a parent.100 “It is the future of 
 
 93. See id. (citing testimony that many young Amish voluntarily leave 
the faith and need to be prepared for fields outside of traditional opportunities 
of the Amish). 
 94. See id. (recognizing the state’s legitimate interest in preparing 
children for a variety of options of future interests regardless of current 
lifestyle). 
 95. See id. (suggesting the case may have turned out differently if the 
parent’s claim of religious belief effected more than the final two years of 
required education). 
 96. See id. at 242 (Douglas, J. dissenting) (“Where the child is mature 
enough to express potentially conflicting desires, it would be an invasion of the 
child’s rights to permit such an imposition without canvassing his views.”). 
 97. See id. at 241 (“The Court’s analysis assumes that the only interests 
at stake in the case are those of the Amish parents on the one hand, and those 
of the State on the other.”). 
 98. Id. 
 99. See id. (discussing disagreement with the majority that the only 
interests at stake are those of the Amish parents and the state when the 
children are all of a high school age). 
 100. See id. at 242 (“As the child has no other effective forum, it is in this 
litigation that his rights should be considered.”). 
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the student, not the future of the parents, that is imperiled by 
today’s decision.”101 If a child’s education is halted, her entire 
future life may be stunted.102 The concurrence and dissent were 
cautioning against the parent–state dichotomy of control over 
children when children’s futures and desires should be 
considered. 
Yoder is considered the paradigmatic hybrid rights case.103 
The Christian Rights movement relies on the ruling in Yoder as 
a coupling of religious rights and parental rights to further 
religious protection arguments.104 In Yoder, the Amish parents 
were removing their children from schools; however, in many 
modern claims of parental and religious rights, parents seek 
exemptions from certain aspects of the curriculum while 
maintaining the child’s presence in the school.105 Multiple 
circuits have rejected parental challenges to curriculum based 
on religious beliefs, specifically regarding sex-related LGBTQ 
 
 101. Id. at 245. 
 102. See id. at 245–46 (“If he is harnessed to the Amish way of life by those 
in authority over him and if his education is truncated, his entire life may be 
stunted and deformed.”). 
 103. See Douglas Nejaime, Inclusion, Accommodation, and Recognition:  
Accounting for Differences Based on Religion and Sexual Orientation, 32 HARV. 
J. L. & GENDER 303, 355 (2009) (“The 1972 case of Wisconsin v. Yoder, which 
Justice Scalia cited in Smith for the ‘hybrid’ rights concept, has come to signify 
the paradigmatic ‘hybrid’ rights case.”) (citations omitted). 
 104. See id. at 356 (discussing different viewpoints on the applicability of 
Yoder). 
 105. See id. (discussing inherent differences in asking to be disengaged 
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inclusive programming.106 However, courts have applied the 
hybrid rights concept in a confused manner.107 
The constitutionally based fundamental right of parents to 
decide the upbringing and education of their children is well 
established through case law.108 Parental rights are often 
coupled with free exercise of religion claims, which creates a 
hybrid right exception as Scalia discussed.109 However, even 
when parental rights and religious rights are coupled, a claim 
to assert the rights may still be limited.110 The following two 
sections consider when the State retains a parens patriae right 
to limit parents authority and when children’s rights should be 
considered paramount to those of the parent. 
C. The State as Parens Patriae Retains an Interest in the 
Protection of Children 
1. The “Best Interest of the Child” Test and a State’s Power to 
Retain Control 
Prince v. Massachusetts111 argues the right of the state to 
control children goes beyond the right of the state to control 
 
 106. See Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Prod., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 534 (1st 
Cir. 1995) (rejecting parental challenges to mandatory AIDS education for 
students); see also Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(rejecting a heightened scrutiny approach for administering curriculum for all 
children); Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1206 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(rejecting a parental challenge to information administered to students 
regarding issues of sex). 
 107. See Nejaime, supra note 103, at 357 (“Some Courts have refused to 
apply the ‘hybrid rights concept . . . . Others have applied it with such a 
rigorous standard that concept does no independent work.”). 
 108. See discussion supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the constitutional 
framing of the fundamental right to discretion in parenting choices). 
 109. See discussion supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the coupling of parents’ 
rights and religious rights to form a hybrid rights claim). 
 110. See discussion supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the concurrence and 
dissent in Yoder, which begin to limit the breadth of parental and religious 
rights when coupled). 
 111. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1994) (concluded 
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adults.112 In Prince, a nine-year-old child was found selling 
magazines in violation of a child labor law.113 The Court 
recognized the State’s parens patriae authority as paramount to 
a parent’s right to discretion in the upbringing of his or her 
children.114 The Court reasoned, “Parents may be free to become 
martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in 
identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children 
before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion 
when they can make that choice for themselves.”115 Further, 
“[t]he right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to 
expose the community or the child to communicable disease or 
the latter to ill health or death.”116 Parents do not have 
unlimited rights in child-rearing.117 “The power of the parent, 
even when linked to a free exercise claim, may be subject to 
limitation under Prince if it appears that parental decisions will 
jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential 
for significant social burdens.”118  
Parens patriae exists as a doctrine for the government to act 
as a provider of protection for those who are unable to protect 
themselves.119 A state maintains constitutional control over 
children if their physical or mental health is at risk.120 Parens 
patriae authority is broad and allows aspects of family life to be 
 
 112. See id. at 168 (“The state’s authority over children’s activities is 
broader than over like actions of adults.”). 
 113. See id. at 159–60 (discussing Betty M. Simmons, a nine-year-old girl, 
who was found to have violated Massachusetts’ child labor laws regarding 
selling magazines in a public place). 
 114. See id. at 166 (“And neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood 
are beyond limitation. Acting to guard the general interest in youth’s well 
being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent’s control . . . .”) 
(emphasis added).  
 115. Id. at 170. 
 116. Id. at 166–67 (citing People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 210–11 (1903)). 
 117. See id. at 170 (discussing the power of the state to control the conduct 
of children). 
 118. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233–34 (1972) (citations omitted). 
 119. Parens Patriae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 120. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) (“[A] state is not without 
constitutional control over parental discretion in dealing with children when 
their physical or mental health is jeopardized.”). 
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regulated.121 Parens patriae authority is not appropriate simply 
because the state is well intentioned and the parent makes a 
decision involving some level of risk.122 
Parental rights and religious rights have limits; therefore, 
the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent’s control.123 
The concept of parens patriae justifies state intervention in 
family matters to protect minors.124 Natural parents do not have 
a clearly established right to unlimited exercise of religious 
belief as it impacts their children.125 Other guardians, such as 
foster parents, enjoy even fewer constitutional protections than 
natural parents.126 Parents must clearly show an established 
right to exercise religious beliefs if those religious beliefs are the 
basis for potentially harmful decisions about how a child will be 
raised.127 
 
 121. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (“[T]he 
family is not beyond regulation.”). 
 122. See Parham, 422 U.S. at 603 (“Simply because the decision of a parent 
is not agreeable to a child or because it involves risks does not automatically 
transfer the power to make that decision from the parents to some agency or 
officer of the state.”). 
 123. See Margaret Ryznar & Chai Park, The Proper Guardians of Foster 
Children’s Educational Interests, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 147, 154 (2010) 
(“Specifically, neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond 
limitation . . . .”). 
 124. See id. at 153 (“Importantly, while parents have a right to raise their 
children free from state intervention, children have a countervailing right to 
protection from abuse and neglect.”) (citations omitted). 
 125. See Backlund v. Barnhart, 778 F.2d 1386, 1389 (9th Cir. 1985) (“First, 
even natural parents have no clearly established right to unlimited exercise of 
religious beliefs on their children . . . .” (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 
U.S. 158, 166 (1944))). 
 126. See id. (“Second, foster parents do not enjoy the same constitutional 
protections that natural parents do.” (citing Kyees v. Cty. Dep’t of Pub. 
Welfare, 600 F.2d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 1979); Drummond v. Fulton Cty. Dep’t of 
Family & Children’s Serv., 563 F.2d 1200, 1206–07 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc), 
cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978); Sherrard v. Owens, 484 F. Supp. 728, 740–
41 (W.D. Mich. 1980), aff’d, 644 F.2d 542 (6th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 
454 U.S. 828 (1981); Brown v. Cty. of San Joaquin, 601 F. Supp. 653, 665 
(E.D.Cal.1985))). 
 127. See id. (“To survive summary judgment, the Backlunds must show 
that they, as foster parents, had a clearly established right to exercise their 
religious beliefs about punishment on a foster child.”). 
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2. Blood Transfusions:  An Example of Parents’ Rights vs. 
Parens Patriae 
Case law regarding blood transfusions provides an example 
of parental and religious rights in direct contrast with parens 
patriae. The Jehovah’s Witness belief system requires an 
abstention from blood transfusions to respect God as the only 
provider of life.128 Jehovah’s Witnesses in State of Washington v. 
King County Hospital Unit No. 1129 was a class action lawsuit 
by the Jehovah’s Witness church of the State of Washington to 
enjoin blood transfusions to any children in the church as a 
violation of the church’s constitutional rights.130 The claims 
before the court involved ten individual cases where children of 
Jehovah’s Witnesses were eventually given blood transfusions 
over the objection of the children’s parents.131 The children were 
removed by court order from the custody of their parents, who 
refused blood transfusions on religious grounds.132 The children 
were declared wards of the state, which allowed the state to 
 
 128. See Why Don’t Jehovah’s Witnesses Accept Blood Transfusions?, 
JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES, http://www.jw.org/en/jehovahs-witnesses/faq/jehovahs-
witnesses-why-no-blood-transfusions/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2019) (discussing 
Jehovah’s Witnesses belief religious biblically based belief to abstain from 
using blood and common misconceptions surrounding said belief) [https://
perma.cc/2D5G-ZC8M]. 
 129. See Jehovah’s Witnesses in Wash. v. King Cty. Hosp. Unit No. 1, 278 
F. Supp. 488, 504 (W.D. Wash. 1967), aff’d per curiam, 390 U.S. 598 (1968) 
(holding that the family is not beyond regulation even when claiming religious 
liberty). 
 130. See id. at 491 (stating the various Jehovah’s Witnesses groups and 
individuals participating in the class action seeking a declaration of the 
plaintiff’s right to refuse blood transfusions and to enjoin the defendants, 
including all medical doctors in the state, Superior Court judges, and Juvenile 
Court employees from administering blood transfusions). 
 131. See id. at 502 (discussing dismissals of certain defendants and 
plaintiffs, focusing in the issues of the case to ten children who were given 
blood transfusions on state order). 
 132. See id. at 500 (recognizing the procedure of the Juvenile Court Law 
allowing superior court judges and juvenile court employees to obtain custody 
over children for the purpose of blood transfusions). 
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authorize blood transfusions under Juvenile Court Law.133 The 
Juvenile Court Law in Washington required a finding that the 
child was “grossly and willfully neglected as to medical care 
necessary for his well-being.”134 Court orders were obtained 
despite express objection of the parents and attempts by the 
parents to provide a written release discharging any and all 
liability due to the parents’ refusal to accept a blood 
transfusion.135  
The Jehovah’s Witnesses alleged the defendant’s actions 
violated the parents’ First Amendment rights to free exercise of 
religion and freedom of association.136 Additionally, the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses alleged that the state’s actions violated the 
implied right of family privacy provided via the Ninth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.137 The Jehovah’s Witnesses stated no 
basis for parens patriae existed because parental discretion was 
exercised in good faith in disagreement with medical 
professionals about the desired treatment.138 The Jehovah’s 
Witnesses argued the actions by the judiciary and medical 
professionals suggested that religion and family privacy were 
not protected for members of the Jehovah’s Witness faith.139 The 
 
 133. See id. (discussing how the court order operates by making a child the 
ward of the court for the individual purpose of authorizing a blood transfusion 
if the doctor deems the transfusion medically necessary). 
 134. WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.010(12) (repealed 1978); id. § 13.04.095 
(repealed 1978). 
 135. See Jehovah’s Witnesses in Wash. v. King Cty. Hosp. Unit No. 1, 278 
F. Supp. 488, 500 (W.D. Wash. 1967) (stating the parent’s attempts to provide 
alternatives to exculpate the medical staff from liability resulting from express 
opposition to blood transfusions). 
 136. See id. (stating the plaintiff’s claim for a violation of the First 
Amendment based on the inability for the Jehovah’s Witnesses to freely 
associate together without prejudice from similar issues and to freely practice 
the religious practice of abstaining from blood transfusions). 
 137. See id. at 501 (stating the plaintiff’s claim for a violation of the Ninth 
and Fourteenth Amendment based on the inability to utilize parental 
discretion in decision regarding a child’s upbringing). 
 138. See id. (recognizing the Jehovah’s Witnesses claim that parens 
patriae is inapplicable to the current case because parental discretion in good 
faith allows for disagreement in the best method to raise the child). 
 139. See id. (recognizing the Jehovah’s Witnesses believe their lives and 
religion were intruded upon by the government’s actions). 
 
  
650 26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 625 (2020) 
 
Jehovah’s Witnesses believed a spiritual duty existed for a 
father to ensure no family member received a blood 
transfusion.140 Accordingly, even though predominant medical 
opinion suggested that blood transfusions were both safe and 
necessary, the Jehovah’s Witnesses sought alternative means of 
treatment.141  
The district court initially deciding the case in Washington 
relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Prince.142 The court 
reasoned that parents are not free to make martyrs of their 
children.143 The court concluded that neither religious nor 
parental rights are limitless and the state may act in the best 
interest of a child through parens patriae when necessary.144 
The court reiterated that “[t]he right to practice religion freely 
does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to 
communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.”145 The 
juvenile court decision was upheld as constitutional.146 Other 
courts have followed the same logic for issues regarding 
Jehovah’s Witnesses and blood transfusion cases.147 King 
 
 140. See id. (discussing the Jehovah’s Witness spiritual belief requiring a 
father to intervene to stop any blood transfusions that would be administered 
to a member of his family). 
 141. See id. at 502 (discussing the existence of other alternative 
treatments and of the alternatives available blood transfusions are often 
considered necessary and among the safest options). 
 142. See id. at 504 (recognizing Prince v. Massachusetts has a 
substantially similar argument and will be considered controlling) (citations 
omitted). 
 143. See id. (discussing the parental right to martyr oneself, but the 
limitation to make a child a martyr before reaching a legal age of discretion to 
make their own choice). 
 144. See id. (stating that neither constitutional right, parental privacy or 
freedom of religion, provide limitless discretion to individuals where the State 
may not exert controlling authority). 
 145. See id. (comparing the relevant example of vaccination where State 
authority trumped the parental and religious protections) (citing People v. 
Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 210–11 (1903)). 
 146. See id. at 505 (determining the state does have parens patriae 
authority to direct children). 
 147. See, e.g., People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769, 774 (1952) 
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County Hospital provides that limitations on freedom of religion 
and the fundamental right to parental control may be necessary 
to protect minors through parens patriae.148 
D. Glimmers of Children’s Rights and the Elimination of the 
Parent–State Dichotomy of Control 
1. Danforth and Bellotti Provide a Road Map for Children’s 
Rights and Autonomy of Choice Through Mature Minor 
Exemptions 
Since the 1960s, an expansion of children’s rights has 
occurred.149 Minors— those under the age of majority—have 
been given various constitutional rights through Supreme Court 
decisions.150 In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. 
Danforth,151 physicians brought a suit challenging an abortion 
law, which required a woman under the age of eighteen to 
receive consent from a parent before the procedure could be 
performed.152 The Court concluded that a female under the age 
 
The recent Prince decision reinforces that conclusion. The court 
there held that a state, acting to safeguard the general interest in 
the well-being of its youth, could prohibit a Jehovah’s Witness child 
from distributing religious pamphlets on the street even though the 
child was accompanied by her adult guardian. Obviously, the facts 
before us present a far stronger case for State intervention. 
Id. (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)). 
 148. See Jehovah’s Witnesses in Wash. v. King Cty. Hosp. Unit No. 1, 278 
F. Supp. 488, 504 (W.D. Wash. 1967) (stating that neither constitutional 
rights, parental privacy, nor freedom of religion, provide limitless discretion 
to individuals where the State may not exert controlling authority). 
 149. See THOMAS A. JACOBS, 1 CHILDREN & THE LAW:  RIGHTS AND 
OBLIGATIONS § 1:3 (2018) (providing an overview of late twentieth century 
developments in children’s rights). 
 150. See id. § 1:4 (discussing five Supreme Court cases that vastly 
expanded the rights of minors including juvenile justice rights and freedom of 
speech rights). 
 151. See Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 
75 (1976) (holding a state could not lawfully authorize an absolute parental 
veto over the decision of a minor to terminate her pregnancy).  
 152. See id. at 72 (discussing Section 3(4) of House Committee Substitute 
for House Bill No. 1211 which required unmarried women under the age of 
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of majority should be given the same right of self-determination 
of body given to an adult female, if the female under the age of 
majority was sufficiently mature to understand and make an 
intelligent decision.153 The Court recognized an absolute bar on 
abortions, without parental consent, was unconstitutional.154 
The Court further stated rights provided by the Constitution 
were not magically attained when a minor reaches the age of 
majority because minors, similar to adults, are protected under 
the Constitution.155 Danforth recognized this mature-minor 
doctrine—even if it did not name the doctrine as such—which 
allowed minors to make decisions about their healthcare if the 
minor could articulate mature reasoning for the decision.156 A 
significant state interest, regarding child protection, could be 
found to give the State authority to condition a minor’s abortion 
on the consent of a parent, but none were provided.157 The Court 
carefully emphasized the invalidity of the statute was due to the 
blanket provision and did not suggest every minor may give 
 
eighteen to obtain written consent by either a parent or a person in loco 
parentis).  
 153. See id. at 75 (suggesting a consent provision for a person other than 
the minor female to sign and her physician will violate Roe) (citing Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973)). 
 154. See id. at 74 (“[T]he State does not have constitutional authority to 
give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision 
of the physician and his patient to terminate the patient’s pregnancy, 
regardless of the reason for withholding consent.”). 
 155. See id. (“Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being 
magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as 
well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional 
rights.”) (citations omitted). 
156.    See Mature-Minor Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) 
(“A rule holding that an adolescent, though not having reached the age of 
majority, may make decisions about his or her health and welfare if the 
adolescent demonstrates an ability to articulate reasoned preferences on those 
matters.”). 
 157. See Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 
75 (1976) (determining that providing absolute parental authority to veto the 
decision to have an abortion will not, with certainty, protect the state interest 
in safeguarding the family unit). 
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consent, without parental supervision, for termination of the 
pregnancy.158 
Children’s rights have further expanded by allowing minors 
to consent to treatment of sexually transmitted diseases and 
mental health conditions without parental consent via mature 
minor protections.159 States have varying limitations on minors 
consenting to medical services.160 For example, all fifty states 
allow minors to obtain medical treatment for sexually 
transmitted diseases without parental consent and twenty-six 
states allow contraceptive services without parental consent, 
but only two states allow abortion without any form of parental 
consent or notice required.161 Various states have statutorily 
created an exemption for mature minors regarding medical 
decisions if the minor can fully comprehend the consequences of 
the medical decision and prove maturity.162 However, the 
numerous exceptions to the age of majority both between states 
 
 158. See id. (distinguishing the nature of the absolute veto power of any 
parent for their child’s abortion decision is unconstitutional, not that any child 
can provide consent for termination of their pregnancy). 
 159. See Josh Burk, Note, Mature Minors, Medical Choice, and the 
Constitutional Right to Martyrdom, 102 VA. L. REV. 1355, 1366 (2016) (“In the 
wake of Griswold v. Connecticut, states began to write legislation that allowed 
minors to consent to the treatment of sexually-transmitted diseases without 
parental consent. Some states, like Illinois, predated Griswold in granting 
medial consent rights to pregnant minors.”) (citations omitted). 
 160. See An Overview of Consent to Reproductive Health Services by Young 
People, GUTTMACHER INST., https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore
/overview-minors-consent-law (last updated Apr. 1, 2020) (last visited Apr. 4, 
2019) (providing a fifty state survey of medical services available to minors 
without parental consent) [https://perma.cc/6USE-TFWD].  
 161. See id. (discussing the number of states that offer specific types of 
medical services to minors without parental consent). 
 162. See Burk, supra note 159, at 1356 (stating the foundational 
requirements for a mature minor exemption). 
Some states have created a mature minor exemption for medical 
consent purposes, which allows a minor the opportunity to make 
the ultimate decision in her medical treatment. If the minor fully 
comprehends the consequences of her decision and makes her 
choice free of coercion or peer pressure, she is given the authority 
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and within states, suggests a categorical age of majority is 
inadequate to meet current social needs.163 
In Bellotti v. Baird,164 the Supreme Court found parental 
consent laws do not obstruct the rights of the minor if judicial 
consent is available to circumvent the parents’.165 To obtain a 
judicial bypass of parental consent, the maturity test of 
Danforth is applied.166 Alternatively, a court may employ a test 
to show judicial bypass of parental consent is in the minor’s best 
interest.167 Judicial bypasses have been substantially criticized 
because no distinct test of maturity exists.168 Without a legal 
test, the extremely subjective idea of maturity is left completely 
to judicial discretion.169 Various criteria have been used to 
evaluate a minor’s maturity including age, academic 
performance, intellectual capacity, future plans, and ability to 
handle finances.170 A general consensus exists that a minor is 
mature to make a decision in a medical context if the minor can 
 
 163. See id. at 1385 (arguing the many exceptions and contours of mature 
minor exemptions suggests the age of majority has become inadequate for 
determining all rights of children). 
 164. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647 (1979) (concluding every minor 
must have the opportunity to go directly to a court without first notifying 
parents when seeking an abortion). 
 165. See id. (stating parental consent and notification laws are valid as 
long as a meaningful judicial bypass process exists for minors). 
 166. See id. at 643–44 (applying the same procedural factors as Danforth 
entitling a pregnant minor to make a showing of maturity). 
 167. See id. (applying the alternative test of Danforth for the minor to 
show an abortion is in her best interest even in the absence of a showing of 
maturity). 
 168. See Anna C. Bonny, Parental Consent and Notification Laws in the 
Abortion Context:  Rejecting the “Maturity” Standard in Judicial Bypass 
Proceedings, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 311, 313 (2007) (“The ‘maturity’ 
requirement of judicial bypass procedures should be dismissed entirely; its 
application is biased and unworkable. Measuring maturity is a subjective 
inquiry evidenced by the fact that even developmental psychologist disagree 
on which factors correctly measure a minor’s maturity.”). 
 169. See id. at 322 (“[J]udges have been forced to develop their own set of 
criteria for evaluating maturity since the Supreme Court has never provided 
a specific standard.”). 
 170. See id. (acknowledging various criteria that has been used to evaluate 
a maturity standard such as academic performance and personal finances). 
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fully discuss the medical procedure, including the risks, and is 
choosing the procedure free of various external pressures.171 
2. Emancipation from Parents Through Statutes and Common 
Law 
In addition to a mature minor test to obtain a judicial 
bypass, many states have emancipation laws.172 Emancipation 
is the act of a parent surrendering all rights, obligations, and 
duties related to the care of a child.173 Emancipation ends both 
the parent’s right to control the child’s upbringing and the 
child’s right to parental support.174 Although LGBTQ children 
may wish to become free from non-affirming parental control, 
the desire to be free from parental support, especially financial 
support, does not necessarily follow.  
The doctrine of emancipation emerged at the turn of the 
twentieth century when many children began working in 
factories.175 Emancipation began as a common law doctrine and 
remains a common law doctrine in eighteen states.176 From the 
1960s until now, thirty-two states have enacted emancipation 
statutes that vary widely in requirements.177 The statutes may 
offer a broad “best interest of the minor” test or provide specific 
 
 171. See Burk, supra note 159, at 1356 (stating the foundational 
requirements for a mature minor exemption). 
 172. See Lauren C. Barnett, Having Their Cake and Eating It Too? 
Post-Emancipation Child Support as A Valid Judicial Option, 80 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1799, 1805 (2013) (discussing the existence of emancipation statutes in a 
majority of states even though the substantive requirements vary widely). 
 173. Emancipation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 174. See Barnett, supra note 172, at 1800 (discussing the traditional 
notion of divergence for emancipation and child support, if emancipation is 
granted child support is denied). 
 175. See Marks, supra note 23, at 81 (highlighting the emergence of 
emancipation of children as a byproduct of children leaving home to work in 
factories). 
 176. See Barnett, supra note 172, at 1803 (stating that eighteen states still 
rely on common law interpretation of emancipation). 
 177. See id. (discussing the explosion of emancipation statutes in the 
1960s, which then continued through 2009 when the most recent 
emancipation statute was enacted). 
 
  
656 26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 625 (2020) 
 
criteria to implement a “best interest of the minor” test.178 
Regardless of specific provisions, all statutes allow 
emancipation only if it will be in the minor’s best interest.179 
Historically, the family law concepts of emancipation and 
child support were divergent.180 A finding of emancipation 
would relinquish any claim a child had for parental support.181 
Often emancipation has been based upon a child’s financial 
independence, releasing parents of financially independent 
children from financial responsibilities.182 Recently courts have 
begun granting partial emancipation, allowing children to 
assert rights normally provided upon complete emancipation, 
but continuing to enforce parental obligations.183  
Partial emancipation provides that a child is free for only a 
specific purpose or from part of the parent’s control.184 Diamond 
v. Diamond185 was the first case in which partial emancipation 
through an emancipation statute was recognized.186 Jhette 
Diamond left her mother’s home at age thirteen due to domestic 
 
 178. See id. (discussing emancipation as a confused doctrine because the 
codification of emancipation has led to great divergence in statutory 
requirements). 
 179. See id. at 1818 (stating that allow state emancipation statutes vary 
widely they almost always demand that emancipation is within the minor’s 
best interest). 
 180. See id. at 1800 (discussing emancipation as severing a parent child 
relationship and child support creating a bond in the parent child 
relationship). 
 181. See id. at 1802 (stating that emancipation typically severs the 
relationship between parent and child which ends all rights and obligations of 
the parents). 
 182. See id. at 1810 (acknowledging many states, regardless of whether an 
emancipation statute is codified, provide emancipation as an element that will 
end child support requirements). 
 183. See id. (recognizing common law allowed for partial emancipation 
that enabled children to retain an enforcement right of parental obligations). 
 184. Emancipation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 185. See Diamond v. Diamond, 283 P.3d 260, 272 (N.M. 2012) (concluding 
that Diamond was entitled to statutory partial emancipation while continuing 
to receive financial support from her parent). 
 186. See Barnett, supra note 172, at 1840 (stating Diamond was the first 
instance of a court statutorily recognizing partial emancipation). 
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violence and substance abuse.187 Diamond was living with a 
foster family and worked for multiple years at a local 
restaurant.188 Diamond requested the emancipation order 
preserve her mother’s obligation of financial support.189 The 
District Court of New Mexico ordered Diamond emancipated but 
allowed her to retain the right to support from her mother, 
which the Supreme Court of New Mexico affirmed.190  
Emancipation is automatically triggered when a child 
reaches the age of majority.191 Some courts have disregarded the 
presumption of automatic emancipation by ordering child 
support to continue through undergraduate education.192 The 
concept is contentious, with some states finding statutes 
requiring child support beyond the age of majority 
unconstitutional.193 Mandatory parental support through 
college and past the age of majority reinforces both the strength 
of partial emancipation and the failure of age of majority 
laws.194 
 
 187. See Diamond, 283 P.3d at 261 (providing the rational for why 
Diamond had to leave home to improve her living situation). 
 188. See id. (stating Diamond had lived with multiple families since age 
thirteen yet maintained a job as server at a local restaurant and high grade 
point average in high school). 
 189. See id. (discussing Diamond’s situation was a classic case for 
emancipation as Diamond had began managing her own finances and had no 
intention of returning to her mother’s home, but she requested to retain the 
ability to seek financial support from her mother). 
 190. See id. (“[D]eclaring Daughter ‘an emancipated minor in all respects, 
except that she shall retain the right to support from [Mother] . . . . ’”). 
 191. See Barnett, supra note 172, at 1800 (stating emancipation occurs 
automatically when a child reaches the age of majority, gets married, or joins 
the military). 
 192. See id. at 1827 (discussing how state courts have ignored the age of 
majority giving automatic emancipation by requiring divorced parents to 
continue to pay child support for secondary education expenses). 
 193. See, e.g., Curtis v. Kline, 666 A.2d 265, 270 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) 
(concluding a Pennsylvania statute requiring parental support beyond the age 
of majority for post-secondary education was unconstitutional). 
 194. See Barnett, supra note 172, at 1827 (arguing a strict interpretation 
of emancipation would undermine the ability of a court to require child support 
beyond the age of majority). 
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The parent–state dichotomy of control has often left 
children without legal rights.195 The rights of all children are 
important, but the rights of LGBTQ children are particularly 
important because LGBTQ children face additional mental, 
emotional, and physical health concerns.196 The parental rights 
recognized under the Fourteenth Amendment and the religious 
freedom exemptions recognized under the Free Exercise Clause 
of the First Amendment can diminish the ability to protect 
children from harmful parental decisions.197 The state acting as 
parens patriae, mature minor exemptions, and emancipation 
offer the few, imperfect pathways for LGBTQ children to escape 
destructive parental authority.  
III. Harm to LGBTQ Children and How the Child Welfare 
System Allows for Further Harm 
A. Harm to LGBTQ Children Generally 
LGBTQ youth endure discrimination, harassment, and 
abuse due to their actual or perceived identities.198 Some youth 
run away and enter foster care seeking refuge from their 
non-affirming biological parents.199 However, the foster care 
system does not always provide a safe environment, and some 
LGBTQ youth may feel safer on the streets.200 Five to ten 
 
 195. See discussion supra Part II.A (discussing the historical context for 
parental and state control of children). 
 196. See discussion infra Part III.A (discussing the various increase 
suicide risks for LGBTQ individuals). 
 197. See discussion supra Part II.B (highlighting examples of harmful 
parental decisions). 
 198. See Larisa Maxwell, Fostering Care For All:  Towards Meaningful 
Legislation to Protect LGBTQ Youth in Foster Care, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 209, 
211 (2013) (stating LGBTQ face a myriad of negative actions within the foster 
care system due to sexual preference and gender identity). 
 199. See id. (noting LGBTQ youth leave biological families and enter into 
the state foster system to find safer homes). 
 200. See id. (noting LGBTQ youth end up homeless after escaping unsafe 
home environments created by both biological parents and foster parents). 
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percent of youth in foster care identify as LGBTQ.201 About 
400,000 children are in foster care each year, 202 which suggests 
20,000–40,000 are LGBTQ youth who may face discrimination, 
harassment, and abuse.  
Suicide is the second highest cause of death in the United 
States for people ages ten to twenty-four.203 Children in the 
LGBTQ community face higher rates of suicide and suicidal 
ideation.204 LGBTQ children experience serious suicidal 
ideation at nearly three times the rate of heterosexual youths.205 
LGBTQ children attempt suicide at nearly five times the rate of 
heterosexual youths.206 LGBTQ children living with neutral 
families (neither particularly affirming or non-affirming) 
attempt suicide at two times the rate of LGBTQ youth in highly 
affirming families.207 
 
 201. See COLLEEN SULLIVAN ET AL., YOUTH IN THE MARGINS:  A REPORT ON 
THE UNMET NEEDS OF LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER 
ADOLESCENTS IN FOSTER CARE 11 (2001) (stating the total percentage of likely 
LGBTQ youth in the foster care system). 
 202. See Foster Care, CHILD TRENDS (May 24, 2018), https://
www.childtrends.org/indicators/foster-care (last visited Feb. 4, 2020) 
(providing a numerical figure for the number of LGBTQ youth in foster care 
across the United States that are possibly receiving inadequate services) 
[https://perma.cc/76W5-EL54].  
 203. See MELONIE HERON, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
DEATHS:  LEADING CAUSES FOR 2016 10 (2018) (providing the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention annual report on statistical analysis of 
leading causes of death for all age groups). 
 204. See Facts About Suicide, THE TREVOR PROJECT, https://
www.thetrevorproject.org/resources/preventing-suicide/facts-about-suicide
/#sm.000195zxu4jkcfrrwjr28clp2ptb2 (last visited Feb. 6, 2020) (providing 
compilation of statistics regarding suicide and LGBTQ suicide) [https://
perma.cc/TH5E-RL9M]. 
 205. See LAURA KANN ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
SEXUAL IDENTITY, SEX OF SEXUAL CONTACTS, AND HEALTH-RELATED BEHAVIORS 
AMONG STUDENTS IN GRADES 9–12—UNITED STATES AND SELECTED SITES, 2015 
19 (2016) (comparing the rates of serious contemplation of suicide by gay, 
lesbian, or bisexual students to heterosexual students). 
 206. See id. at 20 (comparing the rates of attempted suicide of gay, lesbian, 
or bisexual students to heterosexual students). 
 207. See Caitlin Ryan et al., Family Acceptance in Adolescence and the 
Health of LGBT Young Adults, 23 J. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC 
NURSING 4, 208 (2010) (“[T]he prevalence of suicide attempts among 
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The prevalence of attempted suicide is highest for the 
transgender community.208 A medical consensus exists that 
attempting to stop an individual from being transgender is both 
ineffective and harmful.209 Forty percent of transgender adults 
have attempted suicide.210 The transgender community’s 
suicide rate is nine times higher than the overall rate of suicide 
within the United States.211 Ninety percent of transgender 
individuals who attempt suicide do so before the age of 
twenty-five, which highlights the prevalence of attempted 
suicide for transgender children.212 Thirty percent of 
transgender individuals have experienced homelessness, and 
for those who have attempted to access a homeless shelter, 
seventy percent reported abuse.213 The rates for transgender 
individuals experiencing homelessness, experiencing serious 
psychological distress, and attempting suicide all increase by 
 
participants who reported high levels of family acceptance was nearly half 
(30.9% versus 56.8%) the rate of those who reported family acceptance.”).  
 208. See Facts About Suicide, supra note 204 (comparing various LGBTQ 
community statistics on attempted suicide). 
 209. See SANDY E. JAMES ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., THE 
REPORT OF THE 2015 U.S. TRANSGENDER SURVEY 108 (2016), https://
www.transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/USTS-Full-Report-FINAL.PDF 
(acknowledging the general agreement among medical professionals that 
attempts to convert transgender individuals to the sex assigned at birth is 
psychologically harmful for transgender individuals) [https://perma.cc/WX63-
5AFD]. 
 210. Id. at 114. 
 211. See id. (highlighting the stark rate increase in attempted suicide for 
the transgender community over the 4.6 percent attempted suicide rate of the 
total United States population). 
 212. See id. at 115 (providing that one-third of participants reported their 
first suicide attempt was before the age of thirteen, thirty-nine percent 
reported their first suicide attempt was between the age of fourteen and 
seventeen, and twenty percent reported their first suicide attempt was 
between eighteen and twenty-four). 
 213. See id. at 176 (highlighting both the rate which transgender 
individuals experience homelessness and the high rate of harassment within 
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almost twenty percent when delineated between affirming 
families and non-affirming families.214 
Various medical and psychiatric organizations have 
acknowledged the importance of providing affirming care to 
LGBTQ individuals.215 The American Medical Association 
(hereinafter “AMA”) supports health insurance coverage of 
treatment for gender dysphoria.216 The AMA directly opposes 
reparative or conversion therapy based upon an assumption 
that homosexuality is a mental disorder.217 The American 
Psychiatric Association (hereinafter “APA”) has recognized the 
benefits of gender-affirming treatment and discourages barriers 
to gender transition treatment.218 Additionally, the APA 
 
 214. See id. at 8 (analyzing that homelessness, psychological distress, and 
attempted suicide rates are all higher within non-affirming families compared 
with families who affirm transgender status). 
 215. See LAMBDA LEGAL, PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION STATEMENTS 
SUPPORTING TRANSGENDER PEOPLE IN HEALTH CARE, https://
www.lambdalegal.org/sites/default/files/publications/downloads/resource
_trans-professional-statements_09-18-2018.pdf (last updated Sept. 17, 2018) 
(last visited Mar. 6, 2020) (providing statements by professional organizations 
in the medical and psychiatric fields in support of transgender services) 
[https://perma.cc/27H5-4N3C]; see also Policy and Position Statements on 
Conversion Therapy, HUMAN RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/resources
/policy-and-position-statements-on-conversion-therapy (last visited Mar. 6, 
2020) (providing statements by professional organizations in the medical and 
psychiatric fields in opposition to conversion therapy treatments) [https://
perma.cc/JZ9N-6KKT]. 
 216. See Resolution H-185.950:  Removing Financial Barriers to Care for 
Transgender Patients, AM. MED. ASS’N (2016), https://policysearch.ama-
assn.org/policyfinder/detail/H-185.950?uri=%2FAMADoc%2FHOD.xml-0-
1128.xml (last visited Mar. 6, 2020) (stating support for public and private 
health insurance coverage of gender dysphoria) [https://perma.cc/DS5W-
S8YH]. 
 217. See Resolution H-160.991:  Health Care Needs of Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual, Transgender and Queer Populations, AM. MED. ASS’N (2018), https://
policysearch.ama-assn.org/policyfinder/detail/H-
160.991?uri=%2FAMADoc%2FHOD.xml-0-805.xml (last visited Mar. 6, 2020) 
(recognizing the need for the LGBTQ community to receive adequate 
healthcare by committing to medical educational programs in support of the 
LGBTQ community) [https://perma.cc/74GS-GAU5]. 
 218. See Position Statement on Access to Care for Transgender and Gender 
Diverse Individuals, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N (July 2018), https://
www.psychiatry.org/home/policy-finder (last visited Mar. 6, 2020) (stating the 
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supports laws protecting gender diversity.219 The APA has 
stated psychotherapeutic techniques to convert homosexuals is 
based on scientifically questionable theories with no 
substantiated research.220 Other organizations such as the 
American Psychological Association, the American Academy of 
Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, and the American Academy of 
Pediatrics have made similar statements opposing laws 
discriminating against transgender individuals and opposing 
the use of conversion therapy due to the mental affect that 
patients would likely experience.221 
B. Child Welfare Legislation Creates Religious Exemptions that 
Allow Harm to LGBTQ Children 
Parental rights, religious rights, and rights of minors are 
competing rights. The tensions between them become more 
problematic when the state, through the child welfare system, 
is acting as parent. Currently no branch of the federal 
government provides clear guidance on the breadth of religious 
exemptions for child welfare providers.222  
 
APA official action in recognition of appropriate medical treatment for gender 
diverse individuals) [https://perma.cc/5XB7-UDYQ]. 
 219. See Position Statement on Discrimination Against Transgender and 
Gender Diverse Individuals, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N (July 2018), https://
www.psychiatry.org/home/policy-finder (last visited Mar. 6, 2020) (stating the 
APA official action in opposition to all gender discrimination as transgender 
individuals have no impairment in any abilities based on their gender 
identity) [https://perma.cc/CC5B-CW26]. 
 220. See Position Statement on Conversion Therapy and LGBTQ Patients, 
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N (Dec. 2018), https://www.psychiatry.org
/File%20Library/About-APA/Organization-Documents-Policies/Policies
/Position-Conversion-Therapy.pdf) (last visited Mar. 6, 2020) (stating the APA 
official action in opposition to any practice attempting to change an 
individual’s sexual orientation as attempts to change sexual orientation are 
harmful) [https://perma.cc/2YCZ-JVXV]. 
 221. See sources cited supra note 215 (citing various medical and 
psychiatric organizations that have policy statements about LGBTQ 
terminology). 
 222. See Oakley, supra note 6, at 9 (noting Congress has been unable to 
pass overarching legislation either allowing or prohibiting discrimination 
under religious exemptions and the Supreme Court has not conclusively 
determined the constitutionality of state action with religious exemptions). 
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Congressional legislation has been introduced both to 
expand the availability of religious exemptions for child welfare 
providers and to limit religious exemptions in order to protect 
LGBTQ individuals from discrimination.223 The Child Welfare 
Provider Inclusion Act224 and the First Amendment Defense 
Act,225 although unsuccessful, would have allowed 
discrimination against LGBTQ individuals through religious 
exemptions.226  
Yet to succeed in Congress, the Every Child Deserves a 
Family Act227 and Equality Act228 would prohibit welfare service 
providers from discriminating against children or parents in 
various family services.229 The Every Child Deserves a Family 
Act would disallow both discrimination against prospective 
foster parents and prospective foster children based on sexual 
 
 223. See id. at 10 (noting various members of Congress have attempted to 
expand religious exemptions infringing upon LGBTQ rights and others have 
attempted to expand equal protection for LGBTQ rights to supersede religious 
exemption claims). 
 224. See Child Welfare Provider Inclusion Act, H.R. 1881, S. 811, 115th 
Cong. § 3(a) (2017) (stating adverse action may not be taken against child 
welfare service providers who act in accordance with sincerely held religious 
beliefs). 
 225. See First Amendment Defense Act, S. 2525, 115th Cong. § 3(a) (2017) 
(stating the federal government may not take action against a person acting 
in accordance with sincerely held religious belief or moral conviction).  
 226. See Oakley, supra note 6, at 10 (noting the negative ramifications of 
the Child Welfare Provider Inclusion Act and the First Amendment Defense 
Act). 
 227. See Every Child Deserves a Family Act, H.R. 2640, S. 1303, 115th 
Cong. § 3(a)(A)(1) (2017) (prohibiting any child welfare service entity receiving 
federal assistance from denying services on the basis of sexual orientation or 
gender identity). 
 228. See Equality Act, H.R. 2282, S. 1006, 115th Cong. (2017) (extending 
recognized class protections to sex, sexual orientation, and gender identity). 
 229. See Oakley, supra note 6, at 10 (noting the protections provided in the 
Every Child Deserves a Family Act and the Equality Act). 
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orientation, gender identity, and marital status.230 The bill has 
been proposed and failed multiple times since 2009.231  
A handful of states have created religious exemption laws 
of varying powers, because both Congress and the Supreme 
Court have been silent regarding the constitutionality of 
religious exemptions allowing discrimination against LGBTQ 
individuals.232 At the close of 2017, North Dakota, South 
Dakota, Texas, Alabama, Mississippi, Michigan, and Virginia 
had enacted laws allowing child welfare providers to 
discriminate under religious exemptions in the provision of 
child welfare services.233 Originally, these bills focused on 
refusing to place a child with same-sex parents, with whom the 
agency had a religious or moral objection.234 Broader 
discriminatory bills have surfaced however, allowing 
discrimination in more services and against children 
themselves. Tennessee recently became the latest state to allow 
child welfare agencies to operate under religious exemptions, 
even if this jeopardizes the best interests of the child.235 As of 
January 2020, the Human Rights Watch recognizes nine 
states—Kansas, Mississippi, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia—that 
 
 230. See Maxwell, supra note 198, at 221 (stating the specific 
discriminatory actions prohibited by the Every Child Deserves a Family Act). 
 231. See id. at 221 (citing the various representatives who introduced the 
act across a span of years, all failing to even have the bill make it out of 
committee). 
 232. See Oakley, supra note 6, at 5–8 (discussing the various versions of 
state bills that have passed allowing child welfare service providers to deny 
services based on sincerely held religious beliefs). 
 233. See id. at 5 (“At the close of 2017, seven states have versions of license 
to discriminate in child welfare laws on the books—three of which were passed 
in 2017 and five of which were passed in the last three years.”). 
 234. See id. at 5 (stating the broadest swath of discriminatory child welfare 
bills target same-sex parents by disallowing adoption services based on 
religious exemptions). 
 235. See Ryan Thoreson, New Tennessee Law Deepens Discrimination 
Against LGBT People, HUMAN RTS. WATCH (Jan. 28, 2020, 1:42 PM), https://
www.hrw.org/news/2020/01/28/new-tennessee-law-deepens-discrimination-
against-lgbt-people (last visited Mar. 7, 2020) (discussing the Tennessee 
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allow for taxpayer-funded child welfare agencies to use religious 
exemptions to discriminate against LGBTQ individuals.236  
Specifically, Texas and Mississippi have very expansive 
statutes.237 The Protection of Rights of Conscience for Child 
Welfare Service Providers Act in Texas allows agencies to refuse 
children services to which the agency objects based on religious 
beliefs.238 The provisions allow a child welfare agency in Texas 
to deny children in their care mental health services, 
contraceptives, and hormone therapy.239 Mississippi’s 
Protecting Freedom of Conscience from Government 
Discrimination Act240 similarly allows for the denial of medical 
treatment (such as hormone therapy) if the agency has a 
religious objection.241 Most of the mentioned states provide a 
 
 236. See id. (noting the various states who have child welfare agency 
religious exemption laws currently enacted). 
 237. See Oakley, supra note 6, at 5 (noting Mississippi, Texas, and South 
Dakota have the broadest religious exemption protections). 
 238. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 45.005 (West 2019) (stating child 
welfare service providers will be protected if actions are taken based on 
sincerely held religious beliefs). 
 239. See Oakley, supra note 6, at 8 (stating the broad negative implications 
Texas’ expansive statute will have). The author stated: 
Among other things, that means a state has its hands tied—it 
cannot cancel the contract or refuse to give the agency a contract in 
the future—if the agency refuses to provide children in their care 
with necessary medical services (like hormone therapy, 
contraceptives, or affirming mental health care) or even if the 
agency forces children in their care, justified by the agency’s 
religious belief, to dangerous and abusive practices such as 
so-called “conversion therapy.” 
Id. 
 240. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-62-5 (2016) (stating the state government 
will not take action against a religious organization acting wholly or partially 
on the basis of the organizations beliefs). 
 241. See id. (describing the broad circumstances that child welfare 
providers may seek religious exemptions). The statute reads: 
(3) The state government shall not take any discriminatory action 
against a religious organization that advertises, provides or 
facilitates adoption or foster care, wholly or partially on the basis 
that such organization has provided or declined to provide any 
adoption or foster care service, or related service, based upon or in 
a manner consistent with a sincerely held religious belief or moral 
conviction described in Section 11-62-3. (4) The state government 
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general religious exemption to the provision of services, but the 
Mississippi statute allows agencies to deny LGBTQ individuals 
related services by explicitly mentioning “surgeries related to 
sex reassignment or gender identity transitioning[.]”242  
These states have enacted legislation that puts LGBTQ 
children in non-affirming situations, which increases their risk 
of committing suicide.243 Further, these statutes conflict with 
both the American Psychiatric Association and American 
Medical Association’s positions on LGBTQ individuals.244 
Because of increased likelihood of harm for LGBTQ children 
when they are in non-affirming situations, it is important to find 
a pathway for LGBTQ children to escape destructive parental 
authority, especially in the context of discriminatory child 
welfare agencies. 
IV. Remedies for LGBTQ Children to Seek Protections When 
Parental Actions Are Harmful 
The parent–state dichotomy of control coupled with the 
harm LGBTQ children endure in non-affirming homes 
highlights the need to locate legal remedies for LGBTQ children. 
The state acting as parens patriae or enacting protective 
legislation or children asserting substantive due process claims, 
mature minor exemptions, or partial emancipation offer a few, 
 
shall not take any discriminatory action against a person wholly or 
partially on the basis that the person declines to participate in the 
provision of treatments, counseling, or surgeries related to sex 
reassignment or gender identity transitioning or declines to 
participate in the provision of psychological, counseling, or fertility 
services based upon a sincerely held religious belief or moral 
conviction described in Section 11-62-3. 
Id. 
 242. Id. 
 243. See discussion supra Part III.A (discussing the statistically higher 
likelihood of suicide and suicide ideation in non-affirming homes for LGBTQ 
children). 
 244. See discussion supra Part III.A (discussing various medical and 
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imperfect pathways for LGBTQ children to escape destructive 
parental authority. 
A. States Should Utilize Parens Patriae Authority or Enact 
Legislation as a Protective Remedy for LGBTQ Children 
The example of the Jehovah’s Witnesses and blood 
transfusion is similar to discrimination of LGBTQ children 
because each situation presents a conflict between parental 
rights, religious rights, and the rights of minors.245 In King 
County Hospital, the parental refusal to accept a blood 
transfusion on behalf of the child was invalid because parents 
are not allowed to make martyrs of their children, regardless of 
parental rights and religious freedom claims.246 The right of the 
child to bodily autonomy was determined to be superior to 
claims of parental and religious rights.247 When LGBTQ 
children endure living with non-affirming families, they 
experience harm. When parents make medical decisions directly 
affecting the health of their LGBTQ children, those children 
deserve protection.248 When parents take direct medical actions, 
the state as parens patriae should protect LGBTQ children’s 
right to bodily autonomy. 
The state is often hesitant to enforce parens patriae because 
of its respect for the inner sanctum of the family.249 States such 
as Mississippi and Texas, where religious exemption statutes 
 
 245. See discussion supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the confluence of 
parental rights, religious rights, and children’s rights in Jehovah’s Witnesses 
in State of Washington v. King County Hospital Unit No. 1). 
 246. Jehovah’s Witnesses in State of Wash. v. King County Hosp. Unit No. 
1, 278 F. Supp. 488, 504 (W.D. Wash. 1967), aff’d per curiam, 390 U.S. 598 
(1968) (discussing the parental right to martyr oneself, but the limitation to 
make a child a martyr before reaching a legal age of discretion to make their 
own choice) (citations omitted). 
 247. See id. (stating that neither constitutional right, parental privacy or 
freedom of religion, provide limitless discretion to individuals where the State 
may not exert controlling authority). 
 248. See discussion supra Part III.A (discussing increased suicide rates 
due to LGBTQ children living with non-affirming families). 
 249. See discussion supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the courts apprehension 
in interfering in family life). 
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already exist in the context of foster care provision, are unlikely 
to exert parens patriae authority to protect LGBTQ children. 
Similar to the situation in Yoder, parental rights often 
become intertwined with claims of religious freedom.250 The 
religious decisions of parents can conflict with both the interests 
of their children and the interests of the state.251 For example, 
Mississippi courts have noted the preemptory nature of state’s 
parens patriae interest for medical treatment of minors.252 
Mississippi does not allow a parent to claim a religious 
exemption in an effort to not vaccinate their child.253 However, 
the state legislature allows for foster parents with sincerely held 
religious beliefs to deny medical services related to transitioning 
status254 and to exempt those foster parents from government 
action.255 
States are considered the laboratories for experimentation, 
particularly for the regulation of family law matters.256 Take, as 
an example, California. The Foster Care Nondiscrimination 
 
 250. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233–34 (1972) (“[T]he power of 
the parent, even when linked to a free exercise claim, may be subject to 
limitation under Prince if it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize 
the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for significant social 
burdens.”). 
 251. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1994) (“And neither 
rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation. Acting to 
guard the general interest in youth’s well being, the state as parens patriae 
may restrict the parent’s control . . . .”). 
 252. See Brown v. Stone, 378 So. 2d 218, 222 (1979) (adopting the notion 
parens patriae authority requires the state to order medical treatment to save 
the lives of a child via Prince in deciding that no religious exception can be 
allowed for parents to not vaccinate their children) (citations omitted). 
 253. See id. (“[A] person’s right to exhibit religious freedom ceases where 
it overlaps and transgresses the rights of others.”). 
 254. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-62-5 (2016) (stating the state government 
will not take action against a religious organization acting wholly or partially 
on the basis of the organizations beliefs). 
 255. See id. (noting government action is disallowed when child welfare 
service providers are denying medical services and mental health treatment 
on the basis of religious beliefs). 
 256. See Maxwell, supra note 198, at 225 (recognizing family law matters 
to be generally be a state concern and not a federal concern). 
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Act257 went into effect in California on January 1, 2004.258 The 
Foster Care Nondiscrimination Act was the first of its kind with 
broad class designations for “actual or perceived” sexual 
orientation and gender identity and protections against 
discrimination and harassment.259 Unfortunately, the Foster 
Care Nondiscrimination Act lacks an enforcement mechanism, 
leaving parties confused on how the statute will be applied.260 
States should consider the protected parties, prohibited 
mistreatment, specific definitions, clear enforcement 
mechanisms, and provisions for assistance while designing 
protections for LGBTQ children.261  
All states should immediately begin attempting to enact 
similar statutes. However, it is extremely unlikely all states will 
begin to enact broad expansive protections for LGBTQ youth, 
either in the foster system or more generally. Although state 
authority is a plausible avenue for protecting LGBTQ children, 
nationwide state action through local legislation or by state 
intervention as parens patriae is unlikely, especially in states 
that have adopted child welfare service religious exemptions. 
 
 257. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16501.31 (West 2018) (providing broad 
protections for various classes, but specifically for sexual orientation and 
gender identity). 
 258. See id. (recognizing both actual and perceived protected class, 
including sex and gender). The statute reads: 
[T]he rights of a foster child to have fair and equal access to all 
available services, placement, care, treatment, and benefits, and to 
not be subjected to discrimination or harassment on the basis of 
actual or perceived race, ethnic group identification, ancestry, 
national origin, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender 
identity, mental or physical disability, or HIV status. 
Id. 
 259. See Maxwell, supra note 198, at 220 (addressing the merits of the 
Foster Care Nondiscrimination Act). 
 260. See id. (“Parties may also have difficulty determining the most 
appropriate way to seek remedies.”). 
 261. See id. at 225 (discussing the relevant concerns States should 
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B. LGBTQ Children in the Child Welfare System Harmed by 
Parental Action Hold a Valid Substantive Due Process Claim 
Under the Fourteenth Amendment 
The Constitution’s Due Process Clauses, found in the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments, were originally understood to be 
procedural and not substantive.262 In Allgeyer v. Louisiana,263 
the Supreme Court reasoned that in order to be substantive in 
nature, the Due Process Clauses require a deprivation of life, 
liberty, or property.264 To claim a substantive due process 
violation, the preliminary requirements of jurisdiction, 
justiciability, and harm by a governmental actor must be met.265 
The standards of jurisdiction and justiciability (standing, 
mootness, ripeness) require individual analysis and thus will 
not be considered in this Note.266  
1. LGBTQ Children in the Child Welfare System Are Harmed 
by Parental Action via Governmental Action 
A substantive due process claim requires that harm be 
caused by government action.267 Foster systems, whether public 
 
 262. See Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Substantive Due Process Analysis, 
26 U.S.F. L. REV. 625, 625–26 (1992) (noting that substantive due process did 
not conceptually exist prior to 1890). 
 263. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897) (concluding a 
substantive due process violation can occur when there has been a deprivation 
of life, liberty, or property). 
 264. See id. (“[W]e think the statute is a violation of the fourteenth 
amendment of the federal constitution, in that it deprives the defendants of 
their liberty without due process of law.”). 
 265. See Galloway, supra note 262, at 628 (reviewing the preliminary 
procedure for evaluating substantive due process claims). 
 266. Various factual scenarios will lead to different analysis under 
considerations of jurisdiction and justiciability. These standards would likely 
be met in the context of children within the foster system who are harmed by 
their foster parents’ decisions. 
 267. See Galloway, supra note 262, at 629 (“Deprivations of life, liberty, or 
property inflicted by a person acting in a purely private capacity need not 
comply with the due process clauses.”). 
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or private in nature, act in concurrence with the government.268 
Public child welfare systems administered by states meet the 
government action requirement, even though the actions 
LGBTQ children would challenge are actions made by 
individual foster parents.269 Foster parents in the public child 
welfare system are acting on behalf of the state to provide a 
home and an upbringing for children who have become wards of 
the state. The simple act of providing a non-affirming home can 
be harmful, but more egregious behavior such as the denial of 
medical treatment or an attempt to use conversion therapy 
makes the harm direct and actionable.270 
Privatized child welfare systems have a more attenuated 
connection to state action. The various exceptions to the state 
action doctrine are the compulsion, nexus, entanglement, and 
public function tests, which all generally analyze whether a 
state requires, encourages, or is significantly involved in private 
conduct.271 The case history questioning whether private action 
will be deemed state action is inconsistent.272 Historically, the 
 
 268. See Sacha M. Coupet, The Subtlety of State Action in Privatized Child 
Welfare Services, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 85, 126 (2007) (arguing as the child welfare 
system becomes more privatized the acts of private child welfare providers 
should be considered governmental acts). 
 269. See id. at 111 (noting state agencies are constitutional accountable 
for any harms that occur to children in the custody of the state). 
 270. See discussion supra Part III.A (discussing the statistically higher 
likelihood of suicide and suicide ideation in non-affirming homes for LGBTQ 
children). 
 271. See Coupet, supra note 268, at 107 (discussing the various tests used 
to make exceptions to the state action doctrine). The test the article considers 
were: 
[T]he “compulsion” test, exploring the manner in which the state 
has exercised any affirmative conduct compelling the conduct 
complained of, (2) the ‘nexus’ test, examining the degree of state 
involvement in private conduct, and (3) the ‘public function’ test, 
which looks substantively to the nature of the function performed 
to assess its public versus private identity. 
Id. 
 272. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 (1991) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (acknowledging the cases which consider private 
action as possibly a governmental action are not consistent and the courts 
have used a variety of tests and standards). 
 
  
672 26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 625 (2020) 
 
public function test has been most often applied to the child 
welfare system.273  
Within the private child welfare system, the state action of 
legally removing and formally placing children in the welfare 
system must occur.274 The power to greatly benefit or 
detrimentally hurt children lies in the unique authority to break 
apart the family as a fundamental societal unit.275 Further, the 
most common model for public–private welfare partnerships is 
contracting out child welfare services to private providers that 
will continue to be financed by the government.276 Beginning in 
the 1960s, amendments to the Social Security Act allowed 
federal money to fund private, non-profit social service agencies 
creating public–private child welfare partnerships.277 More 
recent amendments to the Social Security Act have enabled 
continued maintenance payments to for-profit and nonprofit 
private child welfare providers for services, which led some 
states, such as Kansas and Florida, to completely privatize their 
child welfare system.278  
The public function test has been construed broadly and 
narrowly by the Supreme Court.279 The more narrow 
 
 273. See Coupet, supra note 268, at 108 (noting the public welfare system 
gave way to public-private partnerships in the 1960s). 
 274. See id. at 102 (“[T]he fact that children may only be legally removed 
and formally placed in the child welfare system through a court order renders 
this conduct arguably the least ambiguous form of state action.”). 
 275. See id. (considering the monopoly of power the state retains to place 
children, which leads to private welfare placement of children that may be 
completely unaccountable). 
 276. See id. at 95 (acknowledging the predominant method of 
public-private partnerships within child welfare provision utilize a method of 
State’s contracting out foster children to private welfare providers). 
 277. See id. at 94 (noting the philosophical shift of the Reagan 
administration toward private solutions to social problems which diminished 
governmental presence in child welfare services and gave rise to the 
public-private partnerships). 
 278. See id. at 95 (acknowledging the continued move toward the 
privatization of the child welfare system based on changes to the Social 
Security Act). 
 279. Compare Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 503 (1946) (suggesting if 
an entity is the functional equivalent of a government entity then it is in fact 
a government entity), with Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357 
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construction of the public function test is more often used.280 In 
Deshaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social 
Services,281 the Court concluded that “when the State takes a 
person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the 
Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume 
responsibility for his safety and general well-being.”282 A 
Deshaney footnote provided the framework for a state’s 
affirmative duty to safeguard children in their custody against 
harm.283 Under the logic of Deshaney, the state must safeguard 
LGBTQ children against potentially harmful situations. 
However, it remains an open question if this fully extends to 
privately contracted child welfare service providers.284 Although 
privatized child welfare systems may not be considered joint 
government and private party action,285 the government action 
requirement can still be met if the conduct is a public 
function.286  
 
(1974) (suggesting the required nexus is present only if the powers are the 
exclusive prerogative of the State). 
 280. See Coupet, supra note 268, at 110 (discussing the inconsistent 
standard for the public function test, but acknowledging a narrow approach is 
often used). 
 281. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 
201–03 (1989) (noting the State’s exercise of removal power gives rise to an 
affirmative duty to protect). 
 282. Id. at 199–200.  
 283. See id. at 201 n.9 (“Had the State by the affirmative exercise of its 
power removed Joshua from free society and placed him in a foster home 
operated by its agents, we might have a situation sufficiently analogous to 
incarceration or institutionalization to give rise to an affirmative duty to 
protect.”); Coupet, supra note 268, at 111, (“[P]ost-DeShaney cases make clear 
that constitutional accountability by state agencies may follow for harms 
suffered by children in state custody . . . .”). 
 284. See Coupet, supra note 268, at 111 (“[I]t remains unclear and 
inconsistent as a matter of common law under what circumstances 
constitutional accountability will extend to the private providers with whom 
state agencies now increasingly contract for services.”). 
 285. See id. at 88 (“Privatization is a rather amorphous and ill-defined 
term, as there are a variety of ways in which public-private partnerships have 
developed and expanded to deliver public services.”). 
 286. See Galloway, supra note 262, at 630 (discussing options to fulfill the 
government action requirement if the action is taken directly by or jointly with 
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Unfortunately, LGBTQ children seeking protection from 
biological parents will be unable to assert a substantive due 
process claim. Even if these children maintain a deprivation of 
life and liberty related to bodily autonomy, no governmental 
action is present. If a child is not in the welfare system and thus 
unable to assert a substantive due process claim, a state should 
have the duty to assert its parens patriae authority to protect 
LGBTQ children from harmful parental action, as discussed in 
the prior section. 
2. Requirements for a Substantive Due Process Claim and the 
Infringement of Life, Liberty, and Property 
After meeting the preliminary requirements, a substantive 
due process claim must succeed on the merits. The Court has 
developed a two-part test requiring first, that the government 
action has affected a due-process interest, and second, that the 
action was sufficiently adverse to constitute a deprivation.287 
The Supreme Court has interpreted the due process interests—
life, liberty, and property—broadly.288 Both the interests in life 
and liberty are implicated when LGBTQ children are living in 
non-affirming homes, specifically when parents authorize 
harmful action such as conversion therapy or the withdrawal of 
hormone therapy.289 Similarly, parental medical decisions that 
increase the chance LGBTQ children will attempt suicide 
should be considered an injury depriving LGBTQ children of due 
process protections.290 
The final, most important step of the substantive due 
process analysis is deciding whether the challenged 
 
the government, such as conduct that is traditionally reserved for the 
government as a public function). 
 287. See id. (highlighting the conceptual framework for evaluating 
substantive due process claims). 
 288. See id. at 631 (“Given the inclusive definition of liberty and property, 
the protected interest requirement does not play a major role in substantive 
due process analysis.”). 
 289. See discussion supra Part III.A (discussing various harms endured by 
LGBTQ children who live in non-affirming homes). 
 290. See discussion supra Part III.A (discussing suicide rates for LGBTQ 
children and how parent actions may affect those rates). 
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governmental action infringes a fundamental right, which 
determines the level of scrutiny.291 If a fundamental right has 
been infringed, the statute under consideration will be subject 
to strict scrutiny and thus presumed unconstitutional.292 If a 
fundamental right of bodily autonomy for children existed, any 
infringement would have to be narrowly tailored to justify a 
compelling government interest.293  
The Court has considered various frameworks when 
defining a fundamental right, but two essential frameworks, 
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”294 and “deeply rooted 
in this Nation’s history and tradition,”295 have developed.296 
Fundamental rights may not be easily infringed upon by the 
state and require a statute to have a compelling government 
interest and to be narrowly tailored at advancing the interest.297 
Government deprivations not related to fundamental rights 
are only subject to rational review.298 Rational review analysis 
 
 291. See Galloway, supra note 262, at 631 (acknowledging the varying 
level of scrutiny applied to a substantive due process challenged based on the 
type of right that has been infringed upon). 
 292. See id. at 638 (“When intensified scrutiny applies, the government 
action that harmed claimant is presumed to be unconstitutional and 
respondent has the burden to prove that the government action is supported 
by substantial justification.”). 
 293. See id. (“[T]he conduct was undertaken for a purpose that is 
legitimate and compelling (very important) and the conduct comprises a 
substantially effective method for achieving that purpose.”). 
 294. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled on other 
grounds by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (stating enumerated 
rights “found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” are valid claims 
against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 295. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) 
(recognizing historical teachings and basic values of society as appropriate 
limits on substantive due process claims). 
 296. See Ayotte, supra note 50, at 1001 (discussing the two major 
frameworks unenumerated fundamental rights are considered under, ordered 
liberty and rooted in history). 
 297. See Galloway, supra note 262, at 638 (“[T]he conduct was undertaken 
for a purpose that is legitimate and compelling (very important) and the 
conduct comprises a substantially effective method for achieving that 
purpose.”). 
 298. See id. at 643 (describing infringements that do not violate 
fundamental rights as only requiring a rationality review). 
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simply asks if the statute is supported by a conceivable purpose 
and arguably furthers the purpose.299 The government action is 
presumed constitutional.300 The system is predictable:  statutes 
evaluated under rational review are almost always upheld and 
statutes evaluated under strict scrutiny are almost always 
struck down.301 Finding an unenumerated fundamental right to 
bodily autonomy requiring strict scrutiny is essential to 
protecting LGBTQ children. 
3. A Fundamental Right to Bodily Autonomy Extended to 
Children Exists 
This Note has considered the history and development of 
children’s rights, the concepts of emancipation and mature 
minor tests, case law putting limitations on parental rights 
(especially when potential harm for the child was present or 
medical decisions were made), and the idea that the right to 
bodily autonomy is not magically bestowed upon “adults” at the 
age of maturity. This Note posits that a right to bodily autonomy 
exists for mature minors. This right to bodily autonomy should 
undoubtedly protect LGBTQ children from governmental action 
that is medical in nature and endangers the mental and 
physical well-being of children.302 
 
 299. See id. (acknowledging rational review as the least searching means 
of scrutiny). 
 300. See id. at 643–44 (“If rationality review applies, the government 
action is presumed to be constitutional, and claimant has the burden of 
proving that the deprivation is not even an arguably rational method for 
furthering any conceivable valid governmental interest.”). 
 301. See Matthew Grothouse, Implicit in The Concept of Ordered Liberty:  
How Obergefell v. Hodges Illuminates the Modern Substantive Due Process 
Debate, 49 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1021, 1057 (2016) (suggesting the tiered 
scrutiny framework of substantive due process has a determinative analytical 
framework, which makes the issue over fundamental rights the crux of the 
framework). 
 302. This Note does not argue for equal protection for LGBTQ children on 
the basis of their LGBTQ identity. Equal protection claims for LGBTQ 
individuals have received rational basis review and not been granted a 
heightened level of scrutiny. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–33 (1996) 
(using rational basis review to invalidate an initiative that allowed 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation). 
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As stated previously, unenumerated fundamental rights 
are protected by the Constitution when the fundamental rights 
are implicit to ordered liberty or rooted in history.303 Ordered 
liberty and deeply rooted historical tradition are the two 
paramount substantive due process considerations; however, 
these considerations do not act as a simply applied two-prong 
test.304 Often substantive due process considerations are based 
on a totality of the circumstances and other competing 
considerations, such as evolving national values.305  
The approach based on deeply rooted national history is 
designed to confine judicial scrutiny to historical circumstances 
that remain outside of the subjective scope of political and policy 
preferences.306 The judicial exercise of locating a deeply rooted 
historical basis has vacillated between considering recent 
history and ancient history, often in an outcome-determinative 
analysis lacking objectivity.307 Substantive children’s rights 
may lack an ancient historical basis,308 but within the United 
 
 303. See Grothouse, supra note 301, at 1059 (stating the approach to 
substantive due process respects history and tradition in guiding the inquiry, 
but those notions do not set an outer boundary in which the past alone could 
rule the present notions of liberty). 
 304. See Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 
N.C. L. REV. 63, 66 (2006) (noting that the theory of historical tradition and 
the theory of ordered liberty have dominated substantive due process 
considerations, but that substantive due process considerations are 
controversial and a doctrine in disarray). 
 305. See id. at 66–69 (suggesting various considerations are applied to 
substantive due process, often outcome determinative, which has led to other 
emerging theories such as the theory of evolving national values). 
 306. See Grothouse, supra note 301, at 1059 (“This approach recognizes 
that judicial nullification of democratically-passed laws must not turn on the 
political preferences or policy judgements of nine (and possibly five) unelected 
and unaccountable Justices.”). 
 307. See Eric Berger, Originalism’s Pretenses, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 329, 
332 (2013) (“Originalist judges approach the theory eclectically, drawing on 
useful historical or textual evidence to support a desired conclusion.”). 
Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 130 (1973) (tracing abortion history to 
the ancient Persian, Greek, and Roman empires), with Obergefell v. Hodges, 
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (recognizing recent history of changing ideals and 
norms, which recognize same-sex relationships). 
 308. See discussion supra Part II.A. (discussing historical concept of 
children as property and lacking any rights). 
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States’ history, children have enjoyed fluctuating levels of 
rights, especially in regards to personal autonomy.309  
Ordered liberty recognizes fundamental rights based upon 
issues of self-determination and personal autonomy.310 The 
ordered liberty theory, in conjunction with the theory of 
historical tradition, of fundamental rights has provided for the 
right to use contraceptives,311 the right to terminate a 
pregnancy,312 the right to refuse medical treatment,313 the right 
to engage in consensual sodomy,314 the right to marry a person 
of a different race,315 and the right to marry a person of the 
same-sex.316 Although the establishment of each of those rights 
considered both ordered liberty and historical tradition, all had 
highly contested theories of historical tradition.317 As the Court 
 
 309. See discussion supra Part II.D.2. (discussing the expansion of minor’s 
emancipation to provide autonomy in employment and contractual abilities). 
 310. See Grothouse, supra note 301, at 1060–61 (“Such ‘privacy rights’ and 
‘liberty interests’ embrace all conduct essential to an individual’s 
self-determination . . . .”) (citations omitted). 
 311. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (recognizing personal decisions relating to contraception 
are protected within the interests of liberty under the Due Process Clause). 
 312. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973) (recognizing the right of 
women to make decisions affecting their future, including abortions under the 
Due Process Clause). 
 313. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) 
(recognizing a right to refuse medical treatment within the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause’s liberty interest). 
 314. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (recognizing 
homosexual consensual sexual relationships as a choice central to personal 
dignity and autonomy that would be protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 315. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (recognizing the right to 
marry a person of a different race is within the framework of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause). 
 316. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (recognizing to 
deny same-sex couples the right to seek marriage diminishes their 
personhood, thus the right for same-sex couples to marry is within the Due 
Process Clause’s guarantee of liberty). 
 317. See Grothouse, supra note 301, at 1062 (stating a substantive due 
process right can be found even when a deeply rooted history is not present); 
see also cases compared in footnote 307 (suggesting the historical tradition 
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considered the concept of ordered liberty in Obergefell, various 
factors such as autonomy, agency, and the sanctity of personal 
decisions were considered.318 The Obergefell opinion began, “The 
Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty 
that includes certain specific rights that allow persons, within a 
lawful realm, to define and express their identity.”319 
Establishing a fundamental right for children to have bodily 
autonomy, when the child is a mature minor, may be a large 
step jurisprudentially, but appears to be a logical step forward, 
given the case law regarding both blood transfusions and 
abortions for minors.320 
Competing fundamental rights exist, however, within the 
suggested right to bodily autonomy for children framework. As 
previously acknowledged, both the enumerated right to freely 
exercise religion and the unenumerated right of parental 
authority are competing rights and could be used as possible 
compelling state justifications for limiting children’s bodily 
autonomy.321 Therefore, a hierarchy of fundamental rights is 
necessary to provide a framework for application of children’s 
fundamental rights, which makes the analysis more complex 
and unreliable. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court chose not to 
address the similar conflict of individual rights in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission322 by 
 
framework is outcome determinative and may use recent versus ancient 
history or specific versus broad contexts). 
 318. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594–97 (recognizing to deny same-sex 
couples the right to seek marriage diminishes their personhood and dignity by 
creating stigma that limits liberty in personal autonomy); see also Pavan v. 
Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078–79 (2017) (expanding the perceived limitation of 
liberty in Obergefell to include same-sex parental recognition). 
 319. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593. 
 320. See discussion supra Part II.C.2–D.1 (providing legal background for 
children utilizing a right to bodily autonomy in the context of blood 
transfusions and abortions). 
 321. See discussion supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the coupling of religious 
rights and parental rights to compete with children’s rights). 
 322. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 
S. Ct. 1719, 1727–28 (2018) (analyzing whether store owners may refuse 
service to LGBTQ individuals when claiming religious freedom exemptions 
and violations of First Amendment protections). 
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remanding it the lower court without addressing the scope or 
allowable application of religious exemptions.323 Although the 
Supreme Court’s recognizing a fundamental right to bodily 
autonomy for children would provide an immediate remedy for 
children in the foster care system, a fundamental right would 
not protect all children from destructive parental authority and 
is likely not the most efficient route to provide effective remedy 
for LGBTQ children harmed by parental actions. 
C. Partial Emancipation:  An Inapplicable Dream or Possible 
Reality to Protect LGBTQ Children’s Choices 
Partial emancipation with continued child support ensures 
that the “best interest of the minor” and financial security are 
maintained, which are generally a state’s goals.324 Some 
statutes state that a capability of financial independence is all 
that is necessary to obtain partial emancipation, not that 
financial independence must already have been realized.325 The 
idea that parental rights and obligations must sever uniformly 
has already been questioned through child custody statutes.326 
If parental rights and obligations are considered completely 
intertwined, decisions made in the best interest of the child may 
become impossible.327 
The explosion of emancipation statutes starting in the 
1960s has been influenced by the changing circumstances in 
 
 323. See id. at 1732 (“The outcome of cases like this in other circumstance 
must await further elaboration in the courts, all in the context of recognizing 
that these disputes must be resolved with tolerance, without undue disrespect 
to sincere religious beliefs, and without subjecting gay persons to 
indignities . . . .”). 
 324. See Barnett, supra note 172, at 1819 (addressing that promoting the 
minor’s best interest and financial soundness of policy are the state’s priority 
goals). 
 325. See id. at 1820 (asserting that some statutes and Diamond suggest 
managing financial affairs refers to the capability to manage affairs not 
current ability to be self-supportive). 
 326. See id. at 1821 (comparing to child custody where parental rights of 
visitation and control are severed, but parental obligations of support remain). 
 327. See id. at 1822 (stating the goal of terminating parental rights to 
protect the child and continuing parental obligations to protect the child are 
not mutually exclusive). 
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parent-child relationships in the United States.328 Children are 
growing up faster with societal and technological changes.329 
The stereotypical nuclear family has become more uncommon 
as fewer people get married and divorce rates grow.330 Modern 
family constructs have necessitated the liberalization of family 
law concepts.331 Strict application of emancipation is 
experiencing cessante ratione legis cessat et ipsas lex.332 Moving 
forward, when courts consider emancipation, the main issue 
should be the purpose for which the minor seeks 
emancipation.333 
The notion that emancipation and child support are 
mutually exclusive is still commonly held with partial 
emancipation viewed skeptically.334 Most courts view the 
inability of children to be financially self-supportive as 
dispositive in an emancipation decision because parental 
support is still necessary.335 The ability for a child to emancipate 
while still receiving child support is considered 
double-dipping.336 Although parental authority to make 
harmful decisions for LGBTQ children is problematic, this Note 
 
 328. See id. at 1829 (emphasizing changing familial and societal dynamics 
as the cause for the growth in emancipation issues). 
 329. See id. (addressing technological shifts, starting from the post-World 
War II era, as a major factor for children maturing at a younger age). 
 330. See id. at 1830 (analyzing the shift in familial composition such as 
the birth rate for unmarried women going from five percent in 1958 to forty 
percent in 2011). 
 331. See id. at 1831 (discussing various areas of family law that have 
evolved and molded to the current needs of families such as the dissolution of 
fault-based divorce). 
 332. See id. at 1834 (suggesting that as the original reason for 
emancipation has ceased, the law itself will also cease if it does not modernize). 
 333. See id. at 1835 (suggesting a primary inquiry for future issues 
surrounding emancipation). 
 334. See id. at 1811 (acknowledging a majority view that emancipation 
and child support will not be granted together). 
 335. See id. at 1813 (confirming emancipation cases form a historic pattern 
of either granting emancipation or granting child support, but not affirming a 
need for both). 
 336. See id. at 1811 (discussing criticism of partial emancipation as 
“having their cake and eating it” when children are granted both emancipation 
and child support). 
 
  
682 26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 625 (2020) 
 
does not purport to suggest LGBTQ children should become 
financially independent to be able to obtain bodily autonomy. 
LGBTQ children are already more likely to become homeless 
and to lack financial support structures.337 Therefore, requiring 
LGBTQ children to obtain financial independence for 
emancipation to be able to make self-affirming choices is 
unrealistic. Partial emancipation may apply in similar ways as 
the judicial bypass, where for a specific decision a minor will 
need to be partially emancipated to make that decision in their 
best interest. 
D. A Mature Minor Exemption and Procedural Judicial 
Bypass:  The Logical Path Forward 
The Supreme Court has suggested the interests of a mature 
minor shall be considered in the context of an abortion.338 The 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause guarantees a 
minor a hearing before a judge who must accept the minor’s 
decision if the minor is determined to be mature.339  
When an LGBTQ eighteen-year-old, legally an adult, can 
stop her parent’s attempt to force medically harmful decisions 
such as conversion therapy or withdrawal of hormone therapy 
treatment, but an LGBTQ seventeen-year-old, legally a minor 
but days shy of turning eighteen, lacks authority over her bodily 
autonomy regarding similar medically harmful decisions, the 
legal procedures determining maturity become questionable. 
Although bright-line age requirements have a place in the legal 
context, potentially harmful medical decisions implicating 
bodily autonomy is not a time where age requirements appear 
 
 337. See James, supra note 209, at 176 (highlighting both the rate which 
transgender individuals experience homelessness and the high rate of 
harassment within homeless shelters leaving many homeless transgender 
individuals without options). 
 338. See discussion supra Part II.B.2 (discussing at length Planned 
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, which established the mature 
minor exemption in the abortion context).  
 339. See Burk, supra note 159, at 1355–56 (“Through the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a minor is guaranteed a hearing 
outside the bounds of her parents’ influence—and the judge must accept the 
minor’s decision if the court determines that she is mature.”). 
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to be protecting the interests of children or society.340 In Bellotti, 
the Court determined that minors hold a due process right to 
bodily integrity in the abortion context.341 A due process right to 
potentially life-altering treatment related to sexual orientation 
or gender identity should be similarly held to exist. 
Mature minor exemptions vary in requirements and 
protections state by state;342 therefore, a federal mature minor 
exemption providing for a judicial bypass procedure is necessary 
and should be guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In the absence of a federal mature 
minor exemption, states should adopt a mature minor 
exemption that adequately protects minors’ interests in all 
potentially harmful medical contexts.  
In Bellotti, the Supreme Court provided a procedure for a 
judicial bypass system for abortions to be decided on a 
case-by-case basis.343 A minor will be given an opportunity to 
demonstrate maturity before a court, and if she is not 
determined to be mature, she will have to demonstrate the 
choice is in her best interest.344 A minor will submit a form to 
 
 340. See id. at 1356 (“Bright-line age limits may be efficient and 
appropriate in many contexts, like drinking or voting laws, but in medial 
situations that have much higher personal stakes, such bright line rules seem 
less appropriate.”). 
 341. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979) (“The need to preserve 
the constitutional right and the unique nature of the abortion decision, 
especially when made by a minor, require a State to act with particular 
sensitivity when it legislates to foster parental involvement in this matter.”). 
 342. See Burk, supra note 159, at 1363 (“This unclear legal realm has led 
state courts to find widely disparate results in similar cases regarding a 
mature minor’s right to choose her own treatment.”). 
 343. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 647 (“We conclude, therefore, that under state 
regulation such as that undertaken by Massachusetts, every minor must have 
the opportunity—if she so desires—to go directly to court without first 
consulting or notifying he parents.”). 
 344. See id. at 647–48 (discussing the procedure and analysis the judge 
will afford the minor in determining maturity). The Court stated: 
If she satisfies the court that she is mature and well enough 
informed to make intelligently the abortion decision on her own, the 
court must authorize her to act without parental consultation or 
consent. If she fails to satisfy the court that she is competent to 
make this decision independently, she must be permitted to show 
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request a hearing with the court, which should be prioritized 
with a short time frame.345 The judge would then determine if 
the minor proved maturity or, at least, best interest.346 The 
system should be designed with a rebuttable presumption that 
minors fifteen years old and younger are immature and those 
sixteen and older have a rebuttable presumption of maturity.347 
Factors such as academic performance, intellectual capacity, 
future plans, and an ability to handle personal finances are all 
factors that may contribute to a determination of maturity.348 
However, the most salient factor is the minor’s ability to discuss 
the medical procedure, understand the risk, and make the 
choice without external pressures.349 If the afore stated 
presumptions are adopted, the burden of proof should be a 
showing of clear and convincing evidence to overturn the 
presumption.350 
Given the varied opinions on the judicial standard of 
maturity and the burden of proof to establish maturity, a federal 
mature minor exemption would provide helpful clarification for 
 
that an abortion nevertheless would be in her best interests. If the 
court is persuaded that it is, the court must authorize the abortion. 
Id. 
 345. See Carol Sanger, Decisional Dignity:  Teenage Abortion, Bypass 
Hearings, and the Misuse of Law, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 409, 424–29 
(2009) (discussing the general features of the minor’s petition to the court 
which will focus on speed and anonymity). 
 346. See id. at 429–31 (discussing the standards and factors and judge will 
consider while evaluating the maturity and best interest standards). 
 347. See Bonny, supra note 168, at 323–24 (suggesting the various 
presumptions should be reputable because trial courts are at serious risk for 
bias and abuse). 
 348. See id. at 324 (discussing various factors that are often considered 
such as academic performance and financial stability but suggests a more 
specific approach by asking about knowledge of the procedure and ability to 
pay for the abortion). 
 349. See Burk, supra note 159, at 1371–72 (stating Courts have reached a 
general consensus that the ability to discuss the medical treatment, the risks 
of the treatment, and to be free of parental and peer pressures are the most 
important factors in determining maturity for minors). 




SEEKING REMEDIES FOR LGBTQ CHILDREN  685 
 
states attempting to apply the exemption.351 Mature minor 
exemption cases will all be fact specific; therefore, no factor 
should be dispositive.352 However, states should adopt statutes 
to recognize the above procedures regarding timeliness, rebuttal 
presumptions, potential factors, and burden of proof to create a 
holistic approach to determine maturity. A mature minor 
judicial bypass may be the only way for a minor to assert her 
rights in the face of parental authority figures making medical 
decisions.353 Mature minor judicial bypasses apply in other 
contexts, such as abortion.354 The adoption of a procedural 
judicial bypass for mature minors enables the minor to 
effectuate claims to bodily autonomy when time is of the essence 
to ensure protection.355 
The minor’s decisions should be dispositive if the minor is 
determined to be mature, regardless of the parents’ or judges’ 
personal beliefs on whether the decision is the “right” 
decision.356 If the minor is determined to be immature regarding 
the decision at hand, the minor can provide an argument for his 
or her best interests. After these steps, the judge may still limit 
the parent’s conception of the child’s best interest, if the decision 
is outside of the constitutional limits established by Prince.357 If 
 
 351. See id. at 1371–72 (“There are many opinions about the proper 
judicial standard used to define maturity; the standard of proof for such 
determinations has varied depending on the court adjudicating the elements 
of informed consent.”). 
 352. See id. at 1372 (“Because every case would be different, no single 
factor or set of factors should be considered dispositive to finding maturity.”). 
 353. See id. (“A bypass system will not only help a mature minor get an 
appropriate hearing, it will also help expedite her opportunity to assert her 
legal rights.”). 
 354. See discussion supra Part II.D.1 (analyzing the mature minor judicial 
bypass system provided in Danforth). 
 355. See Burk, supra note 159, at 1373 (“A bypass regime would allow for 
a full inquiry into a minor’s maturity level without having to wait for the full 
workings of an appeals process. This would be especially useful if the minor’s 
wishes conflicted with those of her parents.”). 
 356. See id. at 1384–85 (“The bypass system should remove the normative 
and paternal religious influence that judges currently possess and put the 
power back into the hands of the individual.”). 
 357. See id. at 1373 (“When the minor is determined to be incapable of 
making a mature choice, the decision of the parents should prevail as long as 
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the parent’s decision is seen as a decision that “martyrs the 
child,” the judge through the state’s parens patriae authority 
will make the ultimate decision. If a parent’s decision regarding 
the medical treatment of an LGBTQ minor directly increases 
the chance of suicide, the judge will need to exert parens patriae 
authority in a mature minor exemption hearing.358 Although the 
mature minor judicial bypass is not an easy path for LGBTQ 
children, especially given each individual judges’ autonomy, this 
is the remedy that is the most logical outgrowth of the current 
children’s rights framework. 
V. Conclusion 
This Note argues that the state has authority to exert 
parens patriae authority when parents threaten their child’s 
health and safety regarding LGBTQ status. This is similar to 
exertions of parens patriae to protect children in the blood 
transfusion and vaccination context.359 A child’s mental and 
physical health is directly threatened in non-affirming 
households. When parents require LGBTQ children to endure 
conversion therapy treatment or stop ongoing hormone therapy, 
harm to LGBTQ children occurs.360 Although the state could 
exert the authority against any parent, when foster parents, 
acting on behalf of the state, make non-affirming decisions in 
the upbringing of LGBTQ children, the state has a duty to exert 
parens patriae authority to defend the children.361  
State statutory schemes, such as those in Texas and 
Mississippi, which provide authority for foster parents to act in 
 
their decision remains within the constitutional confines established by Prince 
v. Massachusetts.”) (citations omitted). 
 358. See discussion supra Part III.A (discussing the various increase 
suicide risks for LGBTQ individuals). 
 359. See discussion supra Part II.C.2 (emphasizing states have the option 
to exert parens patriae authority to protect any LGBTQ youth). 
 360. See discussion supra Part III.A (discussing the various increase 
suicide risks for LGBTQ individuals). 
 361. See discussion supra Part IV.A (highlighting the need for the states 
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potentially detrimental ways by seeking religious freedom 
protections are unconstitutional.362 This Note further posits 
that children have a constitutionally protected substantive due 
process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.363 If the state 
is unwilling to recognize its duty to protect children from harm, 
children must be able to fight against harmful state action 
under a fundamental rights framework. 
LGBTQ children living with biological parents would be 
unable to assert a substantive due process claim against the 
state through the Fourteenth Amendment.364 The state is less 
likely to intervene in matters that occur within the inner 
sanctum of the family.365 Therefore, LGBTQ youth living with 
non-affirming families may seek partial emancipation or a 
mature minor exemption for relevant decisions, specifically 
issues regarding medical bodily autonomy.366 Partial 
emancipation and mature minor exemptions are recognized at 
varying levels among the states, which may limit broad 
applicability.367 All states should be encouraged to enact 
protective partial emancipation or mature minor exemptions for 
LGBTQ children. Further, partial emancipation and mature 
minor exemptions require some level of maturity or 
independence of children, which will also limit broad 
applicability for protection of all LGBTQ children.  
This Note suggests four potential solutions for LGBTQ 
children to seek redress from harmful parental action in the age 
of religious exemptions. However, each of the four remedies has 
obvious limitations and practicability issues. As the legal 
 
 362. See discussion supra Part III.B (discussing the discriminatory 
religious exemptions that have been applied to child welfare services). 
 363. See discussion supra Part IV.B (discussing a minor’s claim for a 
substantive due process right over bodily autonomy). 
 364. See discussion supra Part IV.B (discussing the limited applicability 
to the Due Process claim). 
 365. See discussion supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the privacy and 
autonomy of parents within the home). 
 366. See discussion supra Part IV.C.–IV.D (discussing mature minor 
exemptions and partial emancipations as possible remedies for LGBTQ 
youth). 
 367. See discussion supra Part IV.C–IV.D (discussing the limitations of 
mature minor exemptions and partial emancipations for LGBTQ youth 
seeking to assert their bodily autonomy). 
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framework for children’s rights continues to develop, one of the 
remedies addressed may become a more concrete pathway for 
LGBTQ children to seek redress from destructive parental 
authority. 
 
